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Thesis

THE THEISM OF HERMANN LOTZE

by

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
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


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
PART I - The Historical Background	
Chapter I - Orientation	2
Chapter II - Plato	13
Chapter III - Aristotle	25
Chapter IV - The Span	35
PART II - Lotze's Own Expression	
Chapter V - God and Nature	46
Chapter VI - God and Life	58
Chapter VII - God and Man	70
Chapter VIII - God and Devotion	82
PART III - Developments into the Present	
Chapter IX - Theory	94
Chapter X - Experience	105
Chapter XI - Interpretation	116
Bibliography	121


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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work is to present the side of Lotze's philosophy that deals primarily with theism and discover whether the conclusions from this point of view agree or differ with those from the points of view of the theory of thought and the theory of reality as expressed by Henry Jones and E. E. Thomas respectively. Since theism is a dominant theme in the history of philosophy and Lotze felt that one must know the history of man's thought to deal with it adequately the first part of the work considers Lotze's relations with the thought of his own day, that of Plato and Aristotle and that of the intervening years from Aristotle to Lotze.

The second part considers the expressions of Lotze that bear on the subject. The principal work dealt with is Microcos
mus for it develops the theory of man's culture particularly in regard to experience wherein the answer to the question of the
ism seems to lie. Lotze takes the expressions of the past, adds his own experience and interprets in the light of his own system.

The third part attempts by reference to scattered instances to show how Lotze's system with its emphasis on theism has effected the minds of those who follow him. It does not seek completeness but rather desires to show new lines of thought stretching out from this central position of theism to prove Lotze's own thought that the experience of value would prove theism as far as it is possible to do so in our present stage of growth.



CHAPTER I

ORIENTATION

Every individual thinker who contributes to the world's knowledge through the realm of creativity stands at an apex point in history. He must not only depend upon but must immerse himself in the past. He feels intensely the implications of his own personal life in its relations to the present. And he is led by an insight into the future that is characterized by hope. Hermann Lotze is such a man. He stands at a point that is designated by the middle of the nineteenth century for he lived within its borders though close to each, 1807 - 1881. His thought stands in close relationship to the two great streams of thought that had come down from Plato and Aristotle. In fact he seems to be at the point where the two find a synthesis in the recognition of the reality of both the idea and the scientific particular. He walks with "his head in the clouds" and "his feet on the ground".

Lotze's works find their value in the fact that their ultimate significance is in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling expressed which take the principles of the past and shape them to new life and vigor. The two fields of metaphysics and empirical science which had grown so far apart or had become stagnant in the scholastic tradition of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas are brought into new relationship and made vibrant by the stimulating impressions that each receives from the



other. This tends toward a monism that yet does not deny the dualistic character of the method through which knowledge is given. Here the facts of objective experience are equaled in validity by those of subjective reflection. The series of forms of thought are a systematic whole as developed out of the problems or tasks of thinking. The two work together toward a single objective and the result is an intermingling of effects that are stimulating to both fields.

The vital activity as the spiritual essence of the real world has the good as its end and this justifies Lotze's thought that all metaphysics has its beginning in ethics. The mechanism of nature is the form in which the activity works. The conception of value is very essential for it conforms to the type of good that Kant characterized in his Summum Bonum as that which would be good for every individual. Lotze had studied medicine and the physical sciences under Volkmann and where Hegelianism had given way to pure natural science Lotze helped philosophy regain a place of honor in the hierarchy of the sciences. He studied the movements of thought in positivism, materialism, criticism and post-Kantian idealism and rejected the extremes of each while retaining the essential core of truth that each contained. He tended to reject the theory of the a priori and subjective idealism and also the dialectical methods of a large part of the German school although he might be classified as a descendant of German idealism.

He agreed with Kant's position in the Critique of Pure Rea-



son that there can be no knowledge in science and philosophy without experience. He also held with positivism that there can't be a system of metaphysics possessing absolute certainty and thus intimated the superiority of the subjective realm partially because of its unknowability. He combined the monadology of Leibnitz with the pantheism of Spinoza which sought to reconcile monism and pluralism, mechanism and teleology, realism and idealism, pantheism and theism and he called it teleological idealism. He held to ethical-religious idealism which was also expressed by Fichte as well as to a scientific interpretation of natural phenomena.

In his emphasis on the natural sciences Lotze said that one cannot understand interaction or causal efficiency as the influence of one thing on another without regarding the manifold processes of nature as states of one and the same all-comprehending substance, He sought as many before him had done complete oneness in regard to matter. There was a suggestion of idealistic pantheism which is one way out when one considers the theistic principle. But Lotze carried his monistic emphasis through to the subjective realm for he interpreted the universal substance as the highest reality we know; that is personality, a good being, the God of love. Wilhelm Wundt, born in 1832, was later to express this same theory at Heidelberg as he reflected Lotze's influence. James Ward, born in 1843, asserted in like vein the idealistic emphasis of Lotze.

Kant's moral "ought" shows up very strongly in Lotze. This



is teleological idealism in one expression as metaphysics finds its beginning in ethics. There is provision for the three factors in teleology; ground, cause and end. This often shows the limitations of Spinoza, Herbart, Hegel and others who are rather one-sided and do not consider all three. The modern idealism of Schelling and Hegel attempted to deduce all from the Absolute, but they failed because of their reach beyond human power. They despised mechanism and missed the factor which Lotze realized was so essential though he tended to play down his own writings on the subject in the face of his larger interest in the subjective. The works that he did carry through on the subject of mechanism and the like are generally respected for their factual integrity. Pathology, Life and Life-Force, Physiology and Medical Psychology are the major works in this field.

Volkmann had led him carefully through the paths of the medical sciences and was his intimate friend as well as respected adviser. The fact that Weisse in the field of philosophy had not cut sharply across the lines of the natural had also been of great help to Lotze. Through two fine personalities and true scholars he had found respect for both fields so that he was later able to bring them together without loss of prestige for either. Lotze was definitely known as being opposed to Fichte for his Controversarial Writings were a sharp reply to that writer. But whereas he was really against Herbart he has often been considered as one of the Herbartian school because in the third part of Metaphysics he described sensations as self-asser-



tions of the soul when disturbed.

Lotze was led into the study of philosophy by a strong feeling for poetry and art. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had all developed ideas into a well-expressed mode of culture rather than into a finished system of doctrine. He longed for ever finer expressions of culture and his scientific training made his expression even more beautiful in that it was orderly. He testified many times in his writings to the influence of Weisse for the ideas of this great teacher were often expressed and Lotze held to the validity of some of these throughout his life. As medicine led him to the realization of the necessity for natural science he cut the ground from under many of Hegel's views. His realism, theory of simple essences and perception of truth that causality occurs only where there is a plurality of causes put firm emphasis on the various effects of the objective world. If anyone showed him the way to this thought it was Leibnitz with his theory of monads.

Though Herbart arouses an antipathy in him his fundamental theory is like that of Fichte. The idea of the good is sufficient ground for all existence. Moral values are the key to forms. Yet Lotze doesn't restrict the good to the domain of action. He shows the blissful calm of inactive contemplation and here in his poetry and art he often seems to soar off into the realm of the mystic. Weisse and George are the only ones who can come up to him in German thought in regard to intellectual grasp and acuteness of discernment. His seeking mind ranges far



and seems never to reach its boundaries as it is especially characterized by a lack of dogma. He was truly a philosopher who lived up to the highest concept of his profession. He sought truth and that alone. Perhaps this lead him away from the primary motive of a school for his academic spirit is so strong that he often finds it hard to lead his students through the many devious pathways necessary to their development. He rather sought to drive directly to the essential point to be considered and often left his students behind. But then appreciating their dilemma he would return to them and find his greatest truths in simple expression.

Lotze sustains Fechner in Nanna as regards the likeness of plants and animals and warns in contrast to this against going too far in the theory of types. He was continually tempering abstract systems of smooth appearance with the rough edges of practical situations. He put man in the highest place in the scale of knowable things and insisted that going beyond man was unstable inquiry. But Lotze carried animate existence further down the scale than Fechner since he held that the elements of that which is material in animals also have feeling. He rejects on the other side the idea that celestial bodies have souls and here criticizes Herbart and Hegel.

Fuller makes the statement that Lotze attempted to bring all psycho-physical phenomena within the bounds of a strictly mechanl
ical theory. It is possible to agree with Mr. Fuller if he holds

^{1 - .}B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy, p. 501.



to the definition of science concerning the word, theory, that it is a verified hypothesis applicable to many related phenomena. But the term, related, must be born clearly in mind. There is no attempt to confine these phenomena to the realm of the logical positivist in that they are of one type. They are merely related. Mr. Fuller's words, "strictly mechanical", rather confuse this point as they suggest a limited range to the objective. It is only as they are kept on the level of the purely theoretical that they can fulfill their precise definition. It must be made clear that Lotze gave a large place to emotion without cutting it adrift from his main emphasis on logic. Here again he was influenced by Leibnitz and Weisse who attacked the over-emphasis of Hegel on the head with too little notice of the heart.

Even scientific knowledge was seen by Lotze as an act of faith in the existence of truth and in the power of reason to attain it. This faith cannot be proved any more than the validity of our conviction that phenomena exist or that values like beauty and goodness are real. His theism was supreme in showing how the demands of phenomenal fact, of logical truth and of moral value can be met by one and the same world. He attacked Fichte's view that there can be no ego without a non-ego and therefore interaction and intercommunication are necessary to personal self-consciousness. This was a further step toward the monism of the whole. He said that self-consciousness is bound up with the mere fact of existence in and for itself whether or not the thing so existing has a non-ego with which to contrast



itself. This suggests different degrees of self-consciousness. Perhaps human personalities need contrast, but not God who is the ultimate degree.

Like Fechner and Von Hartman he was not only spiritualistic in metaphysics but was one of the founders of experimental and physiological psychology. His reliance on the scientifically objective was always apparent in this seeming digression from the natural. Another contemporary who was like Lotze in representing Kantian and spiritualistic motives not only but the influence of science as well was Renouvier. It is interesting to note that Lotze, Wundt and Ward, mentioned together previously, were all physiologists. But Weber and Perry relate Lange to Lotze and Ritschl in respect to the judging of ideals independently of their reference to fact. Lotze was by no means bound to the limits of the contemporary natural science of his day. He drew on it largely for methods and recognized the hypothetical character of many facts.

Lotze's work in aesthetics was significant in anticipating the theory of empathy, Einfühlung, according to which the enjoyment of aesthetics in form, such as symmetry is occasioned by the perception of corresponding movements and tensions in the organism. Again science and beauty were closely related and there was further suggestion of the monism of the one source. Faith in reason is the only final base of all knowledge and the emotion

^{2 -} Alfred Weber and Ralph Barton Perry, History of Philosophy, p. 466.



of beauty and the logic of symmetry are equal pillars on this base. Since all of the elements of reality react to one another in a way that is determined to a great extent, it must be concluded that the nature of each is implicated in the nature of the rest, or that all parts are of one substance which is a vitally connected whole. Thus Lotze's ultimate view of nature is monistic rather than monadistic and here he definitely modifies the view of Leibnitz.

The key to all of this is that the substance or whole (the word, substance, was in common usage in the time of Lotze though it is rather frowned upon now), itself recognizes such changes and parts as its own. Only spiritual subjects exercise this function and can be regarded as ultimately real. We follow the trail of these subjective particulars through our finite selves to God. Lotze really illustrates the two sides of the problem of knowledge as he shows intelligence fashioning its world out of that which is exceedingly indefinite and also follows a webwork of things and relations that is supplied by nature. He feels that each of these two emphases is necessary for they both supply a lack, but then he goes on to show that they are contained in each other. Yet many times it seems hard for him to make a choice between the two as it has been hard for philosophers of all ages and perhaps this makes him more instructive in the recognition of the problem. Too many of the world's thinkers have been completely one-sided on the question. Theism demands both

^{3 -} Microcosmus, B. 9, Ch. 3; Metaphysics, B. 1, Ch. 7.



sides for its explanation. Lotze had the extraordinary power that so many have copied since his time of seeing both sides in this particular problem and he would not avert his eyes from 4 either.

From the position of the general doctrine of being or ontology he makes a positive assertion. Like Hegel and Herbart in giving a constructive system he gives first place to a general discussion of the most universal characteristics that we find ourselves constrained to ascribe in thought to any reality which is to be an intelligible and coherent system and not a mere chaos. All attempts to formulate a theory of the way in which the what of things flows from a mere that, are attempts to answer the absurd question as to how being is made. The notion that things have a that or substance prior to their what or quality, and consisting simply in being which is not this or that determinate mode of being, is thus without meaning as well as superfluous.

As demands vary from time to time, the behaviour of the part under consideration will then vary correspondingly, though to all appearance its surroundings may, for a spectator who fails to grasp the end or purpose realized by the system, be identical. There is no ultimate logical principle in virtue of which we are constrained to think of the particular quantities we denote as mass and energy as incapable of increase or diminution, nor again have we any experimental means of proving that those quantities

^{4 -} Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, p. 58.

^{6 -} Metaphysics, B. 1, Chs. 1 & 2. Metaphysics, B. 1, Ch. 3, Sec. 33; B. 1, Ch. 7, Sec. 208 ff.



are more than approximately constant. But to calculate there is needed some quantitative identity as an a priori postulate of 7 mechanical construction. This postulation is made possible through the use of the function of intelligence. "The most solid part of our conviction was that the highest, most unbending, most general and most necessary law anywhere presented to us by the world is but the self-imposed condition on which the one creative Infinite has based its eternal evolution." Brightman states this whole position in a very comprehensive phrase as he says that Lotze combines theism with an idealistic view of 9 nature.

Microcosmus has rich empirical material and it is from this background that Lotze speaks with a new voice. He turned the field of philosophy from its metaphysical trend toward abstractness and brought it down to earth. He sank his foundations deep into the soil of personal experience and was ever mindful of the objective reflections of that experience. Yet he did not lose the subjective point of view. It was really his starting point and he never left it for the ease of scientific complacency.

^{7 -} Metaphysics, B. 2, Ch. 7.

^{8 -} Microcosmus, p. 395.

^{9 -} E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 159.

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CHAPTER II

PLATO

In many respects Plato's thought of God and the universe is difficult to relate to that of Lotze for the two were developed against such different backgrounds. Yet there are many emphases through which a similarity and kinship may be traced. The term, God, is applied in the writings of Plato both to the mover and the moved. The suggestion is that of many gods with each having an effect on some part of the whole. Through this there runs a semblance of unity in that all the gods are characterized by an otherness that is not available to man. This otherness is able to transcend the bounds of the natural as man knows it and in doing so has a control over or an effect upon the natural. This early idea is expressed much more clearly in Lotze's thought as he establishes God in direct relationship to nature.

Yet in spite of necessary changes over a period of evolutionary development the two thinkers are in close contact with each other. God is as much a part of their metaphysics as He is a part of their religion. In fact, religion is to them only one process in the whole development of man's thought, for science and normal living lead to God just as much as the worship of Him does. Religious insight is a form of knowledge and God is the sustaining ground of all things. Thus knowledge of Him may be reached through all fields. This concept that both men have in

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common brings about the realization that here is a philosophical insight that has been exceedingly prominent through the ages with the most respected of philosophical thinkers. Lotze was able to establish it in his system to an extent that had never been known before. The way that he traces its activity through the natural order is particularly significant to a world that is not able to accept the animistic view of nature that was popular in Plato's time and to a large extent for many centuries after him. In fact it might be said that this type of world first began to find itself in the beginnings of the last century with the emphasis that was being placed upon the natural sciences. The attempt at a science of psychology of which Lotze was one of the founders is an indication of the demand that has so recently arisen for a justifiable relationship between the mind and its natural object.

Plato is often quite close to the Christian tradition of God for this tradition is partly a result of the emphasis of Platonism. The God that Plato describes has moral perfection and although God is not directly a person in his thought God does look on the world with loving care and works continually for the good of man. Here are repeated many of the characteristics that Christian philosophers have ascribed to God and surely in this light there may be seen the parallel with the God that Lotze upholds with his argument. Lotze began with ethics.

The main assumption of both men was that the natural world required an explanation and ground in a realm other than itself.

This need felt throughout the ages has been the prime motive be-

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hind the position held by metaphysics. Lotze and Plato are again in agreement as to the general line of argument that supports this venture into another realm. The fact that there is order in the world is the starting point. The teleological process is clearly apparent as it drives the world toward one final goal, the good. Ethics must be the realization of purpose in the minds of both of these men for they see the need of mankind of learning how to live together. The beautiful orderly process that is in nature must be brought into the mind of man as well as into his bodily functions. Good is the result of orderliness and just as there is disturbance in the physical organism when it is treated roughly so there are repercussions in the mind when it faces a hostile situation.

The <u>Timaeus</u> brings out rather forcibly the thought of Plato that there must be posited a mind that will grasp the structure of the abstract order and impress it upon the physical world that we know. Thus the individual must turn to this same mind to find the order for his mental and psychological existence. A mind that is complete and powerful enough for such a function is necessary and it is here that Plato and Lotze find God. This thought does not carry completely throughout the rest of Plato's works. He is merely feeling his way while Lotze has the benefits of a long Platonic tradition developed and improved. Yet the essential truth is the same.

The world needs a cause. "It is impossible for anything to attain becoming without a cause." Thus God is the creative in Timaeus, 28a.

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telligence that is the efficient cause of the world ground. Lotze carries on to a position of constantly recurring creativity in
which God is in continual contact with the world but here again
it is the development of an established theory. Lotze's position
here is not that merely of repetition. He has been able to clear
away the chaff of the intervening years and discover for his own
thinking the truth of the Platonic thought. The fact that Plato
does not always hold himself rigidly to this thought or state it
as clearly as it is later stated further emphacizes Lotze's ability in the field of selection and clarification.

In the development of the effect that God's creative intelligence has upon the world Lotze is not nearly so rigidly idealistic. In speaking of the work that Christianity has tried to
do he says that "in conflict with mundane circumstances and human
passions, and yet linked to both as the instruments of its realization, no ideal can, in the course of its historical developll
ment, remain faithful to its full perfection". Yet though the
two men realize many differences in the method by which the Cause
has its effect upon the world their fundamental assumption is in
character the same. The changes in method are largely due to
Lotze's recognition of the seeming vagaries in the physical order.
It might be said that Lotze is a more practical man with the advantage of more advanced scientific knowledge.

Yet through it all they both want to find God. This is their great desire. They recognize the need for something which

^{11 -} Microcosmus, Bk. VI, p. 273.

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is outside the natural order and now they want to know what that something is and how it is able to express itself in the way that it does. Here they enter the great realm of speculation which is quite an intellectually respectable process if a rational system is adhered to. Insight plays a large part and from this is developed the explanation of concepts and argument based on experiential observation. But here we find a parting of the ways. Plato does not hold that God is absolute or infinite while Lotze does. Plato substitutes the receptacle and the ideal pattern as those things which are uncreated and timeless and finds God in a subsidiary position as being a created thing himself. Plato does not get his student out of the dilemma that is thus set before him and here his argument falls far short of the high standard that Lotze maintains. Much of this is due to the position that the two men hold in the evolutionary process of thinking. It is unfair to compare them unless this fact is always kept before our minds. It should be recognized also that we are trying to find the principle of agreement in the nature of ideas and not in the elaboration except as it contributes to the essential nature.

This orderliness of life is further exemplified in the high regard in which both men held beauty. Plato is often a critic of the arts and artists, yet his continued emphasis on aesthetics reveals his own inner feeling. He feels that the aesthetic moment should not merely be a moment, but an extended duration and he also declares that music has a greater influence on morals than anything else. Lotze entered the field of philosophy primarily rather than that of mathematics because he wished the

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overtones that were there superimposed upon the mathematical order. In both the aesthetic feeling is expressed through every
activity as the one supreme principle makes its beauty felt
through all things. Both reach inspirational heights though perhaps Plato goes beyond Lotze in fervor while Lotze is restrained
by his emphasis on logic and clarity. Their emphasis on the fine
arts is a deduction from this metaphysical position that they
have in common. It is the expression of that which is great and
wonderful through the ordinary and the mundane. It is man reaching the heights without leaving the foundation of his own observable experience.

Concerning the nature of the soul there is a difference of opinion. Plato sees the soul as having the ability to mediate between mind and nature in such a way that it has a degree of control. But it has such a subsidiary position that it nowhere reaches the position of complete responsibility that Lotze ascribes to it. He considers it to be the one source of the ability of the individual to deal intelligently with external nature. He maintains that the soul is not the product of such external nature, but is complete and independent in its own right. But the important point of agreement is that the soul as both men see it carries out certain functions that could not be done on the purely natural level. It is a subjective function and here again is the relationship of the natural world to an otherness that finds its center and ground in God.

The idea of the good is also an essential to the thought of both Lotze and Plato. Plato makes it the one final standard that

. -¥ A A shall be adhered to in all particulars. It is the ultimate explanation of all activity and it is the most fundamental factor in metaphysics. Ultimate value and ultimate being are joined in this great expression. The good is the absolute power. Lotze does not give the good such an independent character. He makes it an attribute of the person of God. But then this is the crux of the difference in the thought of these men for Plato holds that ideals are real while Lotze makes them characteristics of real personality. Thus the good runs through all of Lotze's theory and explanation having a tremendous effect even if it is not always triumphant. But as the mind is able to control its activities toward a good end so does the good come into being.

"Good and good things do not exist as such independent of the feeling, willing and knowing mind; they have reality only as 12 living movements of such a mind."

Although the Platonic Eros and the Christian Agape must not 13 be confused as Nygren states, both meaning love yet coming from two different backgrounds of thought, the love that is in the soul is another vital factor in this comparison. The good and the beautiful are synonymous in Plato and it is this love that responds to the good. The good and the beautiful may also be related in Lotze for a thing is beautiful where it is an orderly expression of the great Intelligence in nature as well as in human activity. Thus in human activity as order prevails both

^{12 -} Microcosmus, Bk. IX, p. 721.

^{13 -} Nygren, Agape and Eros.

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beauty and goodness are brought about. The ultimate dream of love is an order between men in which they may be completely at peace with each other through an understanding of each other's mind that would if carried to its final point result in mutual absorption. In Lotze, love, goodness and beauty all find their expression on the same level while in Plato the good and the beautiful are absolute and identical norms that the individual submits to through the activity of love. The great aim of both is an orderly process controlled by a unifying intelligent factor. The theme of God in life as we know it is the strength of the discussion and Plato and Lotze have their eyes fixed on the same goal.


The concept of mind finds a similar expression in these two. They both feel that the mind is in its very nature perhaps the most active feature of the world. Plato decries fixation and complacency. Truth comes leaping into the mind only after it has sought out many avenues of expression through continuous application of the activity of the mind. Lotze puts his emphasis on the mind rather than on truth as Plato does. Both men consider the importance of mind and truth, but they disagree as to which is the most fundamental. Yet they do agree on this feature of activity. To support the thought of Plato just above Lotze says, "A universal desire after knowledge and a universal tendency towards complicated action are natural instincts of the 15 human mind". This activity is pertinent in that with both men it

^{14 -} Epistles, 341c, d. 15 - Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 657.

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is reaching toward the one end of truth and thus the good. It demonstrates the character of man. He is not satisfied with mere natural explanation, he wants something more that has an eternal character. By his very nature he is a seeker after higher values and through them the figure of God who is associated with them. Men often go off the track, it is true. They are often confused and led astray by the many opinions and types of combinations that appear in the world of affairs, but inherently they seek the good. There is no other end that will sate their longing.

The principle of reason stands out very clearly in any elaboration of either man's thought. It moves more gently in Plato than it does in the scientifically minded Lotze, but it still wields great strength. Plato follows Lotze in moving down into the practical world. In spite of his emphasis on the reality of ideas he does not draw away into monastic separateness but in the Republic fulfills the need for a discussion concerning the application of his theory to the social sphere. As a member of a social organism he feels its pressure upon him very decidedly and responds with some practical suggestions that still have a weighty effect upon sociological theorists. He feels that a philosopher takes on public office unwillingly but will accept his duty and because of his unwillingness and emphasis on the thought life will be a good administrator in taking the broad view of practical affairs. Lotze, of course, is much closer to earth in this respect. He is primarily interested in developing a way of life for the present and the world that we meet in daily life. He wants to find the end to which the Supreme Will bends the course



of its uniform progress and so he says that since this is his aim then "attention is in the first place attracted to the conditions of external nature under which we are placed and their varied in
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fluence upon us, whether obvious or unobserved".

Thus though both men seem to proceed on the basis of the same fundamental presuppositions Lotze takes a greater interest in the practical aspect of physical life. This practical emphasis leads him through many involved discussions concerning the physical organism and these take up a large part of his most complete work, Microcosmus. Yet they are so constantly related to the workings of God in the world as being a part of those workings that the principle aim of the work is adequately fulfilled. Metaphysics is given its expression through the natural order.

It is from this same consideration that the later developments in psychology come. Psychology must necessarily consider the nervous system and physical reflexes of the organism and yet it does so merely to discover the more vital truth, the inner workings of the mind. The psychical characteristics of personality are gradually revealed and although no absolute objective observations of personality may be expressed as certainty, certitude may be considered a valid result. When this certitude reaches a point where it borders on universality then it may hold a place that is very close to if not actually certainty. This is perhaps the greatest advance that Lotze makes over Plato in realisting God to the natural world.

16 - Microcosmus, Bk. VI, p. 6.

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Yet even in this field of contact between the subjective and objective Plato has many suggestions that fit in very well with the Lotzian theory. Plato's doctrine of human nature is particularly applicable in its consideration of the complexity of the soul. He says that human nature is both divine and earthly. is this thought that has made such a strong impression on Christian thought through men like Paul and Augustine. It is the same fundamental idea that is the basis for all theistic thought. medium in an interpretive sense between God and the world is man. While Plato's strongest emphasis is on the good he admits that man may turn away from the good. This leaves only one fundamental characteristic to be considered for Plato does not recognize the presence of evil except as a turning away from the good. It is later Augustine's devotional expression. "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O God, and our hearts are restless 'til they rest in Thee"

Lotze does not show such complete dependence on the one side..

He gives man metaphysical freedom of such nature that he may to a large extent work out his own position in relation to God and yet his view of the world does establish the fact that man must meet God at every turn in some form of expression or another.

Plato says that reason is the driving force in this activity of man. It is the controlling force in conduct both for Plato and 18 his teacher, Socrates. If one has knowledge of a thing he will probably be driven to act according to the good of that thing al

^{17 --} Augustine, Confessions. 18 - Plato, Protagoras, 352b, c.

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though Plato admits that this is not an absolute in every particular. Yet the essential thing is to get knowledge. It is virtue. Plato has put reason above desire and with this tendency Lotze is in agreement. This is a sharp break from the theories of human nature that have been upheld by so many thinkers both before and after Lotze. They have begun with desire and tried to find the answer to man's place in the world. It seems that here they go astray and Lotze has made one of his greatest contributions to modern philosophy in staying on the side that Plato established. He admits the place of desire, but shows it to be merely a development from the more basic position of reason. He keeps it still subordinate to the one eternal overlying principle that he is searching for and uses reason with all of its fine developments merely to find that "something more". "The shadow of antiquity, its mischievous over-estimation of reason, still lies upon us, and prevents our seeing, either in the real or in the ideal, what it is that makes both something more than reason.

19 - Microcosmus, Bk. VIII, p. 360.

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CHAPTER III

ARISTOTLE

Early in his thinking Aristotle followed his teacher, Plato, fairly closely. He agreed with Plato's idealism and theism, his doctrine of immortality and his dualistic ethics. But he soon began to move away from this position, and the relationship that we find to Lotze involves this later thought. Aristotle and Lotze were much alike in temperament. Where Plato moved off into realms of abstraction inspired by deep emotion they remained on the ordinary levels of experience and kept close to the practical aspect. Lotze saw Plato's position very clearly as we have tried to show, but he recognized it as the result of certain logical considerations. This recognition of all observable evidence as well as that obtained through introspection is the strong link that bound Lotze to the Aristotelian method, if not always the Aristotelian conclusions. In fact it does not seem to be too much of a generalization to say that Lotze agreed largely with Plato in his conclusions and premises while he stayed close to Aristotle in regard to method and evidence.

Aristotle defines space with extreme mathematical precision. It is complete and all physical objects have a place in it; thus they are all related. The system of physics is worked out on this solid basis. It is one of the dependables of all consideration. There is no possibility of void and space has a solid quality that makes it measurable. Lotze depends on this systema.

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tic exposition for his development. The empirical level is firmly grounded and can be depended upon to produce evidence of quality.


Lotze states the contributions that these two thinkers made. He first refers to Plato. "Plato's doctrine of ideas was the first attempt to grasp the nature of the thing in general concepts - a grand attempt which, though unsuccessful, yet exercised 20 an influence for long ages to come." But Plato often omits relationship and system and as Lotze says, "Aristotle was sensible of these deficiencies; a taste for the observation of nature, and systematic occupation with the forms of thought, drew his attention to the numerous relations which connect the individual elements of reality into one living whole, and to the ways in which these relations are expressed by our thought". Lotze also has "a taste for the observation of nature". He develops his thought along lines of natural scientific inquiry that would do justice to a scientist of the highest caliber in any age.

Time is necessary as a measuring factor and is united to space by motion which takes place within the limits of space. As Aristotle says, "Time is the measure, or number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after'." Lotze looks on it in just as practical manner, but where Aristotle so often confines himself to the particular Lotze refers to the broader aspects. He looks

^{20 -} Microcosmus, Bk. VIII, p. 325.

^{21 -} Microcosmus, Bk. VIII, p. 329.

^{22 -} Physics, IV, 220a, 11, 24-25.



on the period of historical time over a long range as making great contributions to the thinking of the one who will reflect on their meaning. He will not confine himself to any definite formula of direction for he shows how history moves from an unknown beginning to an unknown ending. Yet he does see the tremendous implications of great periods of civilization as lessons from the forces that work in history.

In spite of the lack of data that was available in his day Aristotle's theory of astronomy was surprisingly accurate for he developed it on the system of spheres and circles even as stars are known today to move in circular forms or orbits. But Aristotle's chief interest was in the field of biology and it is here that he comes closest to Lotze as Lotze discusses nature. Aristototle sees the appearance of the soul in the transition from increanic to organic bodies and this soul is a combination of varcious elements presented in the organism. Lotze cuts the soul away from that which is purely organic and yet his consideration of its existence involves the characteristics of a highly developed organism.

Aristotle says that the soul is the first actuality of a na23
tural body furnished with organs. But this makes the soul entirely dependent upon the body. If the forms of the body were
not present the soul could not exist. Lotze admits a bond and an
interaction between body and soul, but he definitely states that
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the soul is not a resultant of physical actions. In making this

^{23 -} De Anima, II, 412b.

^{24 -} Metaphysic, Bk. III, Ch. I, p. 191.

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mechanism and the relation of that to the physical. Aristotle saw that the soul was not a physical substance, but he did not break over into the explanation that Lotze was later able to give. It is especially interesting to realize that the basic elements of our modern psychology were lying dormant in the early theory of Aristotle. Yet these very essentials were forced to wait for one who could sympathize with and understand both Plato and Aristotle. One who was led by visions of the beautiful and divine and yet who walked the ways of medical science.

Though all of the elements were present it took an involved study of metaphysics to bring them out for psychology has its foundation in metaphysics. This is not the method of natural science and though natural science contains much of the material that is involved in the study, it is in metaphysics that the drive originates. Yet through all of this it was the purpose of both Lotze and Aristotle to bring the discussion down to the realm of practical experience. Aristotle holds that "the impersonal, universal, superindividual and self-identical character of the actualization of the potential intellect in all human organisms is not so abstruse and remote from everyday life as it seems at first sight. It is a matter of common experience." Lotze says that "every soul is what it shows itself to be, unity whose life is in definite ideas, feelings and efforts".

^{25 -} Fuller, History of Philosophy, p. 147. 26 - Metaphysic, Bk. III, Ch. I, p. 181.

In the discussion concerning God there is found a tendency toward agreement and yet Aristotle emphacizes the transcendence of God while Lotze establishes His immanence without destroying any of the power that is generally regarded as belonging to a transcendent God. Lotze shows how the active reason of man comes very close to the Divine Mind especially in its more reflective processes. But Aristotle feels that there are only slight flashes of insight on the part of man that unite him with the truth of divinity. These flashes are very meager in quanity and quality. Lotze's position is dependent on his consideration of the soul and its ability as thought. "The soul, without its unity being on that account endangered, is itself everywhere present where, in the connection of all things, its own states 27 have attached to them the consequent states of other elements."

Aristotle makes the active reason the only thing that is immortal in man. It survives though all else that is known to us disappears. But at the same time it survives us also for we share the mortality of our organic structures and their expressions. Lotze gives the same high place to active reason, but shows that the starting point of the activity is in the soul.

Thus as it depends upon the soul for its origin it is made a characteristic of the ultimate quality of a person, the soul. Here the immortality of the active reason is incidental to the eternality of the soul and thus active reason finds a solid basis in the subjective metaphysical sphere. But still the question concerna

^{27 -} Metaphysic, Bk. III, Ch. V, p. 300.

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ing the immortality of the soul does not belong to metaphysics according to Lotze. The human mind does not have the power of decision in this matter. Lotze says that he can rely only on the general idealistic conviction; "that every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; that everything will pass away which had its authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's 28 course".

He goes on in a consideration of this problem concerning the origin of the soul, but never gets beyond this fundamental statement. His attempt is merely to help others to understand why he must come to this conviction. Lotze is perfectly frank to admit that there are some questions even beyond the jurisdiction of metaphysics as we know it and open only to divinity.

In the matter of ethics Aristotle conditions Plato's position that ethics rests upon absolute knowledge of a transcendent good. He says that the nature of right and wrong is rather to be inferred by using perceived facts as evidence and illustration. He follows his original tendency to rely in every situation largely on the evidence that is given in the natural realm. Here ethics is largely concerned with the human individual and his many earthly functions. This is not synonymous with intellect as in Plato, but is concerned with happiness. Still the knowledge of happiness can never be exact so this type of ethics is not

^{28 -} Metaphysic, Bk. III, Ch. I, p. 182.

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nearly as well developed a science as Aristotle had considered it to be. Lotze seems to recognize both of these phases. He states that there must be an ideal worked out by intellect and a consideration of universals. But the practical application of many of the ideals thus established must be considered on another level. Then Lotze investigates the forms of approach to life that different individuals take. He conditions the program of ethics to a very great extent on that consideration and yet never leaves out the progress of the ideal as it runs through each particular situation.

It is the interest of the individual that has prime importance for Lotze. He sees that a man may be met in the vulnerable region of the things that he is interested in and from there be led to a point that may bring about a good. It is interest that designates the success or failure of all things and ethics must realize that feature if it is to become practical for the social group or individual. But he recognizes the need and place for a constant factor that will give some grounding to any social progress that is developed. Interest could not be completely free for then it would become chaotic. He establishes both ground and possibility of change by his definition of interest. "This interest of our ideas, which constitutes their power, has a constant element and a variable one." Thus in the logical development which is best suited to both idealism and realism in ethics he finds that the joining point is interest, itself.

^{29 -} Metaphysic, Bk. III, Ch. II, p. 225.

. 4 the second of th of a The whole world of sense impressions meets this dividing line and is classified thereby. It is not that things in themselves are good or bad. It is the question as to whether they are termed good or bad by our interest which when functioning correctly considers both the ideal and the mitigating circumstances. Aristotle brings in the conditioning factors of pleasure and virtue along with others and establishes in scientific consideration the same general method of ethics that Lotze does. The difference again lies in the origin and guidance of the principle. Aristotle takes it from a wide range of observable conditions while Lotze centers it in the individual's mental deliberation and lets the conditions rotate around that point.

Because of the fact that Aristotle's thought is based on the natural order as it appears to man he reacts strongly to the expression of natural beauties. Although he does not stray off into the sublimities as Plato often does he does find a response that leads him to careful consideration of the fine arts. Here also he and Lotze are often in agreement though Lotze sometimes sees things in the expression of the beautiful that Aristotle does not believe are there. To Aristotle the fine arts are an imitation of nature and he is very critical of Plato's thought that art is in reality a moral lesson. Aristotle sees art as bringing out the reality that lies in nature though not always apparent in the sense object itself. Then the purpose of art is to put man into conformity with the values of nature by giving him pleasure.

But art is a living experience. It is a creative venture

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on the part of individuals both in its creation and enjoyment. In this respect it would involve a freedom that is necessary to creativity. Nature does not have that freedom according to Lotze. He says that there is unlimited freedom of action involved in the conception of the divine essence but the fixed course of 30 nature does not seem to bear any traces of that freedom. Here Lotze moves closer to Plato as he sees the forms of art being expressed in sense objects, but places the reality of that art in another sphere which is an essence of divinity. Aristotle's demand for dependence on nature in itself has made him lose sight of the essence that is beyond nature though connected to it.

Following this line of reasoning Aristotle relied on the process of induction. He had no doubt but that the human mind could apprehend the formal structure of the universe in its entirety through the intuition of forms and categories. He felt that complete knowledge of the universal was given with the perception of particulars. It had to be some species of substance and some kind of species. Yet this method could not take him all the way. Lotze saw the fallibility of this type of approach. He doubted the absolute validity of this confinement to a formal structure. He was constantly driven beyond it in investigation and never felt completeness unless this added factor of the divine essence was made a part of each situation.

Aristotle said that spirit is thought thinking itself. The

^{30 -} Metaphysic, Bk. II, Ch. VIII, p. 138.

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approach here is that of including spirit within the cognitive function of the mind. Lotze's approach was one of lifting spirit to a higher level and making it in a certain sense independent of the mind though working in close collaboration. The method that they took was practically the same for both of them. Lotze had the advantage of seeing a clearer metaphysical realm on which to depend for his consideration of the natural while Aristotle in his dealings with nature tended to go off at tangents in the realm that both felt nature lead to, the metaphysical. Aristotle had been driven by a lack in Plato to a separate ground of argument. Lotze was searching for a synthesis of the two in a more organized form of the metaphysical and the natural.

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CHAPTER IV

THE SPAN

From the great tradition of these two men who were to influence philosophy in all its phases down through the ages to the present day there was to be laid out a long and torturous path for theism. Yet through all of the varied emphases that were to be presented it was to rear its head time and time again, bloody but unbowed. Plato and Aristotle died in 347 B.C. and 342 B.C., respectively, and Roman culture began to make itself felt strong ly upon the Greek mind until in 146 B.C. when the Roman domination became complete physically and the Roman influence led Greek thought to a more practical emphasis. This was felt first in the systems of the Epicureans and then that of the Stoics. The Epicureans were related to Lotze in their theory of thoughtful pleasure. This emphasized the fact that men follow lines of activity because of the pleasure derived from them and this pleasure is well controlled so that many fine ends are realized. The beginnings of Lotzian psychology show that he realized the need for such consideration.

The Stoics brought out an emphasis that Lotze made a central feature of his thinking. This was the delight that men found in themselves. The realization of their own capabilities gave them new courage and stability in a fluctuating world. In Lotze it was through the medium of selfhood that the character of divinity was to be found. The opposition of the following sceptics to

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these assertions led to a new syncretism that drew together the previously conflicting lines. Here the demand was for the particulars of science and a reacting distrust of the Occidental influence that had brought in suggestions on the mystical plane.

The worth of Christianity was upheld by the Gnostics especially as Christianity related itself to nature and the physical systems. The concept that nature was favorable to man's development was set up in contrast to the old law of an eye for an eye. This was a definite suggestion of the presence of God working through nature as Lotze conceived it. The contributions that were later to find fuller expression in the Lotzian theory were already beginning to mount up and the tracing of this gradual accumulation is quite clear.

The Neo-Platonists were the next group to add to this collection. They held to a position that was very close to Lotze in stressing the ethical emphasis. They affirmed the thought that the highest ethical aim is the apprehension of the divine. This was the same thought that was to find pious expression in the words of Augustine, to know God is the supreme good of life. It is really the theme of all theistic philosophy and comes as the name of the group implies from the contemplation of divine ideals on the basis of the reality that Plato ascribed to them. The fault of this theme is that there is a tendency for the world to retreat into the background. Yet if the Lotzian emphasis is given full expression it may be seen as a climax after the values of the natural world have been fully considered as helpful evidence and reflections of the divine mind. But these

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values are none the less real because of their subsidiary position, subsidiary in that they are steps along the pathway to God
and each step must take its position in the graded scale.

The Church Fathers attempt to bring out the finest features of both the Gnostics and the Neo-Platonists. They lead to an established position that would be a norm for Christianity and in order to do this they spent much of their time in refuting the opposition that arose to the synthesis which they set up. Augustine is one of this group and may be characterized as the greatest bulwark of its strength and not only for this group but for Christian philosophers for a thousand years from his time on. He died in 430 A.D. The harm that was wrought by this obsession for the will of God was a denial of the metaphysical freedom of man and a reaction against the ways of physical activity. Again the swing was too far to one side and Lotze's demand for knowledge of the physical was not to be found to any great extent among these thinkers. Even the Gnostic point that nature was of great value was ignored as they took other lesser points from the Gnostic position.

Scholasticism came along to attempt to bridge the gap that had been created between the spiritual and the physical. It sought to bring the church that had been divorced from this world back into the normal way of life. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas set the standard and the attempt was made to make ecclesiastical dogma accessible to natural understanding. Thomas lived in the thirteenth century and there had been a long period of relative stagnancy since Augustine. Consequently there had

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appeared many new problems that had to be faced. Part of the task of scholasticism was to solve these. The procedure was to bring rationality into separate doctrines and then give logical arrangement to all so that they would fit into an over-all system. This system attempted to bring a natural understanding to the larger group of students in appropriating supersensuous material. No matter what phase of activity a thinker adhered to he might find himself in this general scheme in relation to all other phases. Through it all definite steps were shown to rise to a comprehension of dogma. If these steps were followed there was room for all sciences and yet all led to the one truth of faith in God. This corresponds in method with Lotze's position. There is the same wide sweep that he considers and also the devotion to the absolute divine principle.

The greatest difference is in the attitude of approach. Scholasticism had its dogma already created and started from that point to subjugate and organize all under that ultimate belief. Lotze began with experience and the recognition of culture to reach a position where he could establish a fundamental belief. The emphasis of both in dealing with the natural world was Aristotelian. But since Thomas was bound to the authority of the Roman Catholic church in dogma he could not be completely open-minded in investigation as Lotze tried to be. He had to establish an indestructible position for the church. He did this by separating faith and reason and allowing each to have its own field of investigation. The dogma of the church was a matter of revelation and thus faith. Therefore whenever faith came in con-

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flict with reason faith would take precedence for that would mean that reason had not found the truth in that particular situation. In Lotze faith and reason were so intertwined that advancement in each field led to a resulting progress in the other.

The position of Thomas was firmly established and was to continue even down to the present day as the standard for many thoughtful philosophers. But into the main stream of philosophic thought there came a great transition period that was later to find itself involved in the universal movement of the Renaissance. This period was begun by a group who were known as Theosophists. They said that philosophy was divine wisdom. The attempt was made to break the scholastic dualism and let all proceed systematically from the one source. Again the theme is close to Lotze's theism though the method is inadequate. The Cosmosophists reacted by saying that philosophy is secular wisdom. Monism was yet maintained but the shift was made in regard to source. The age-old problem persisted. How were thinkers to explain the universe; through the spiritual or the physical?


The Thesophists took dogma back to the gospels and tried to reconstruct it apart from the church on the basis of the thought of the apostles. The root of the theory was in revelation from God and there was a great similarity to the Barthians of the present day. The Cosmosophists reawakened the systems of ancient Greece with a particular emphasis on Aristotle. They brought out the naturalistic and thus lesser side of Plato's thought to develop their own position. Through all of these activities the

- x - a Series Control of the m and the state of span is being constantly strengthened by new cables that link certain parts of it to one of the towers at each end. But in linking itself with one tower the result is that it must also depend upon the other. Philosophy maintains its contact with the past but it never ceases to look to the future.

Out of these movements also necessarily came theories that met the contemporary situation. First there was the ecclesiastical political, next the non-ecclesiastical political and then the naturalistic political. These all were directly expressive of the manner in which the abstract theory could find practical realization. Thus God came to take a place in the civic life of the day and this was especially true of the whole medieval period. Aristotelianism in the medieval sense was the dominant theme through all of these philosophies beginning with scholasticism. Yet they cut too sharply between worldliness and spirituality and thus really lost Aristotle.

The break into modern philosophy tries to resolve this extreme dualism. It puts man in contact with the world directly and yet keeps his metaphysical contacts through an inner spiritual life. Man is the central issue as he never had been before. Principles now begin to rotate around him and the emphasis that Lotze puts on personality is fully justified through this new emphasis on the liberated spirit of the individual man.

Pantheism is the system that now becomes the criterion for new thought. Descartes sets a standard that is later to be acclaimed again and again. He holds that mind is the key to all



things. It has many different forms and effects, but they all may be traced back to the one reality in mind which is found to vary from the one mind of the universe only in the matter of degree. Lotze follows this path rather closely while his main objection lies in the fact that Descartes does not ascribe enough reality to the physical object. Malebranche counteracts Descartes without leaving the pantheistic system by saying that the key is body and all bodies are a modification of God. This puts the emphasis too far in the other direction and yet tends to aid in satisfying Lotze's demand for the reality of the objective.

Spinoza took Descartes' theme, but said that individual existences were of the nature of substance which is God. This gave a larger range to each individual instance in that the subjective and the objective each had a small place in the existence and substance was considered to cover both fields. This also touched on Lotze for he wished to include both the subjective and the objective. Yet it fell short because the concept of substance was not broad and inclusive enough.

Realistic and idealistic systems rebelled against pantheism and set up an opposite position to repeat the process of controversy in these matters. Yet when these systems were carried all the way through they are seen to be essentially atheistic and thus cannot be counted as having a large connection with Lotze. Their function though did in several minor instances use and keep alive in discussion theories that he was later to use in a different form. Realism had followed Aristotle and enlightened the materialistic conceptions while idealism took after Plato

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and opened up a rationalistic explanation and expression of the higher values of metaphysical reality.

The stream that included the philosophers of the world objected to the many one-sided theories that had been put forth and were expressive of a sentiment that has always had a certain vogue in the history of philosophy. These thinkers studied man in his environment and it would have done Lotze's heart good to seek to unearth the solutions to man's personal problems. They were very sceptical of recent previous thought and developed a critical ability that was carried on by all philosophers of the world in the future.

On top of this fine beginning there came a new emphasis that was extremely broad in its scope. The mediation of opposites was attempted on a great scale and it was this attitude that Lotze took. These groups did not go as far as he was later able to go for the emphasis here was to deal with those theories that were already established. The work of reconstruction had to be gone through before there was a creative basis for further progress. Criticism was the general title for this group. The attempt was to reach positions that could either be called realidealism or ideal-realism. The members used the past, but their purpose was to criticize and thus transcend it. It was here that Kant was to revolutionize philosophic thought simply by critical analysis and suggestion though he never quite seemed to reach a positive position in regard to theism. Still he laid the ground for it and did all but declare it. He gave it intellectual respectability in one sense for he considered philosophy

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to be the knowledge of rationalism and empiricism. His work was mainly in analysis and not especially in positing new concepts of the world order. He wanted to explain that which is. Although Lotze did not always agree with him no man who followed him could leave out the tremendous truths that he drew forth from the world that men know through observation.

Kant had done excellent work in resolving Leibnitz and Locke, but still he was largely on one side for his work merely added up to an elaboration of natural science. He had not satisfied the so-called faith philosophers and although he seems to have tried to, he never would go far beyond his beloved empiricism. Several opponents arose to attempt to compass the field of subjectivity that Kant had not quite explained. Reinhold was the leader here, but he merely succeeded in accentuating one side without getting a complete answer. To consider the issues thus raised along came the science of knowledge especially with Fichte and his expressions in both the theoretical and practical.

Schlegel and Schleiermacher take up the controversy from opposite positions of feeling and the system of identity with the latter upheld by Schleiermacher making the greater contribution. Schelling continued to bear the system of identity aloft in the attempt to see things as eternal rather than the nothingness of the temporal and spatial. The movement in opposition to these successes was toward pantheism and then its opponent individualism as Herbart and Schopenhauer took the center of the stage. These two were mediated as pantheism and subjectivism were reconciled. The themes that Lotze was particularly inter-

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ested in were being considered from many points of view and he was later to take great advantage of the condensation afforded by the conclusions to such widespread investigation.

Next Cosmosophy and Theosophy took the opposite sides of another argument to keep alive the old issue and they were again mediated, but through all of this the activity was on a very critical basis. Hegel's panlogism declared that reason is everything in an attempt to develop and clarify the system of identity and the science of knowledge. He set a standard in his logic that was revered by his followers and his dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis reflected clearly the procedure that had been foremost in recent history of philosophy.

There had been so much discussion between realism and idealism, individualism and pantheism, naturalism and theosophy and an assimilation of these seeming opposites that after Hegel there came a break in the continuation of such discussion. Philosophers turned to opposing or defending the Hegelian position but in a way that was constantly bringing out new theories and thus getting further and further away from Hegel. Phenomena were discussed in the metaphysical relationship of orderly system, in the realm of religion bringing to bear the many questions that Hegel had suggested in regard to Christ, immortality and theism, and in the fields of politics and the ethics of the social order. As these grew away from Hegel they culminated in a reconstruction program in which the whole history of philosophy was reconsidered and adapted to use.

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As such systems were considered new truths about them were revealed and they were developed along the lines that stood the test of critical analysis. Hegel fell, but the advancements that he had made contributed to the development of a new group that would not accept anything that was not fully justified by experience and reason. This lead them to an even greater metaphysics based on the solid grounds of science though never allowing that science to confine the thought life of the individual. The men in this group were many for it was a golden age for philcsophy. This perhaps partly accounts for the fact that even the greatest of them have sometimes been lost to view by the generations of philosophers who were to succeed them. Their pupils were small in number to each individual teacher and only two or three have been able to come forth from them to make a lasting impression on the minds of our day. Bowne was along with Ladd one of the chief ones of Lotze's pupils to fulfill this function for him.

Lotze was at the climax of this group. He was stimulated by contacts with brilliant contemporaries in his own land where most of these men were located and he benefited from studies that had brought the past into living reality. His position in the history of philosophy was extremely advantageous and his willingness to learn from the past was the height of academic humility. To this he added a visionary yet practical mind.

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CHAPTER V

GOD AND NATURE

The most striking feature of Lotze's view of nature is its strict adherence to mechanism. Thus he begins by hitting the leading argument of his opponents and taking that argument into his own position to use it as an important accessory to his theism. As he says, "perhaps also it will at last appear that mechanism as a whole, far from being antagonistic to the true tasks of mental life, has itself been taken as a necessary working element in the great totality of things of which only partial glimpses of separate sides are afforded to the human mind by the fluctuations of the spirit of the age". He uses it but makes it a subsidiary attribute and thus merely a part of the whole. At the same time he wishes the fact made clear in the mind of his reader that mechanism is not as purely simple as many consider it to be and that the real scientist recognizes this fact of variableness and fluctuation. The law is universal, but the many forms of interpretation of that law may bring one to quite divergent points of view.

The rule of effeciency is a very strong one, yet even effeciency is often tempered by conditioning circumstances. Lotze discusses the theory of atoms in an advanced manner and then brings out the points of speculation regarding them that may

31 - Microcosmus, Bk. I, p. 26.

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lead to an opening of a new world that had not been considered up until the time that such discovery was made. Finally it appears that no mechanistic theory can be absolute for it is one of the considerations of the field of knowledge and absolute knowledge is untenable.

This investigation drives him back to a recognition of the inner nature of things and the fact that all outer connections spring from this inner life of the thing that is the expression of a great state of movement. It is on this peg of thought, that expressions come from within the individual elements, that Lotze later hangs his argument for metaphysics. He shows that the mechanistic view of nature demands metaphysics for its explanation. There is a comprehensive unity to all seemingly divergent forces which never denies the validity of physical science, but rather affirms it. The laws of nature determine the results and weld them together into a world, but there is a presupposition of the relation of elements on which the succeeding results depend.

The law of nature is a mere by-law of the intelligence or expression of the intrinsic activity of a thing. Immanent operation in things is an ultimate fact. The action of one thing on another cannot be explained by the transition of a state or mood. It must go back to the original source. No law can compel one element to change because another does. And yet it can't be known how absolute unity is also many. "We think we know what water is, what mercury is, and yet we can assign to neither con-

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stant properties belonging to it, apart from all external condi32
tions." Yet the question as to what things are is not so difficult. They manifest the properties that are within them even
though we may sense them in many various states. The great
problem of nature seems to be as to how they can exist and can
manifest themselves as they do. All of nature constantly leads
us to this problem and here physical science limits itself without trying to cross the boundaries that the question, what, sets
up.

In the realm of the "what" Lotze finds that there is quite adequate investigation as far as method is concerned. The body of scientifically precise laws is concerned with governing the motion of matter. He suggests that this is related to another area in parallel fashion for there are also a number of empiric observations that tend to govern or explain psychic manifestations. But in the third and higher realm we lack very decidedly any scientific observance. Here it is that we need to discover "the laws that govern the states of being in general, from which the science of physical nature and that of mental life should flow as two different applications of a common underlying principle".

The way to discover this is through the unity of the soul which is the identity of the perceiving subject. It is here that all impressions from various parts of the external world and from various periods of time are collected. It is the nar-

^{32 -} Microcosmus, Bk. II, p. 189.

^{33 -} Microcosmus, Bk. II, p. 195.

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row doorway that opens into a realm unbelievably large in its scope. It is an investigator rather than an originator. Thus it prepares the way for the intuitions of time and space as they are brought about by the process of the mind which unites and relates action expressed by the mutual relations of impressions. In order to understand this process of nature we must stop and gather into one undivided act of knowledge the past and present members of the series and survey all their mutual relationships at once. As it is considered in time, so in space. We gather the existing order of the external world and translate it into one complete concept that is immediately all revealing of the properties of space. The cognitive energy of the individual thus evolves the relations of impressions in space and time after receiving the impressions. It is an active work and not simply a receptive acceptance.

It is not the mere presence of images that is involved. It must go beyond products of the mechanical course of ideas. Concepts are gained only after the thought process of the individual refers the content that he has obtained to its corresponding universal. The universal may be depended upon for reference for the content that is gained from images is a coherent whole since it reflects the indivisible meaning of that of which it is the image. The universal and the meaning behind the image are brought into collaboration and harmony through the activity of the mind. Since the soul is able to find this material on both sides, the mental and the physical, to be of like nature it follows that there is a unity from which both proceed on the basis

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of the aforementioned underlying principle.

The question of body and mind relationship has always been one of prime importance in philosophy. Lotze considers that the attempts which have been made to set up a mediating factor are false for they simply add to the confusion with a third element. He states that neither one has control over or is able to initiate the other. The degree of their relationship which is so coordinated that it almost approaches identity at times is determined by an inner characteristic of each which in its appearance is independent of the other. It is only as the independent force begins to assert itself that it is discovered that it conforms harmoniously to the independent force of the other. Once again we are led to the consideration of a unity behind the two instead of the third factor. Every concept of the order of nature and its relationship to the mental process leads to the fundamental base of theism or at least the conditions for theism. From that point on the procedure is one of establishing through investigation the laws that govern states of being.

The soul originates in itself a series of inner states and it is these that nature makes the starting-points of movements. Likewise the forms of the body are finally fixed or prepared at a period prior to the unfolding of these mental activities. The significant fact is that the mind is able to understand the body and can depend upon the harmony that exists between the mental realm and nature. The fact that the two can know each other at all is revealing of a previous unity beyond the area of our investigation as to scientific proof. But this does lead to a

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closer investigation of nature. Here Lotze suggests a different interpretation of the matter of nature. Whereas it is generally accepted that matter consists merely of that which we sense he says that it has two forms of existence. The first is the normal one that it has an outward form in accordance with the well-known physical properties, but the second is that it is inwardly 34 stirred by mental activity. Here is the mind of nature that explains so many seemingly unexplainable problems of nature. How could nature be so well adapted and arranged unless it were based upon an intellect.

It is an internal systematization of homogeneous masses that is often quite apparent to the senses, but is not always directly connected with them. Matter cannot be completely explained as a "what". It requires something more to justify the position and action that it takes. It is not extension in space that is the answer to a consideration of nature matter, but rather the realization that it is but a veil of an infinite realm of mental life. We may think of each atom or unit of matter as the seat of a peculiar mental energy. Yet this does not mean that it is synonymous with our thought. It always remains separate and preserves its individuality.

Lotze was quite willing to accept the normal picture of nature. He held that the natural conception of the universe which finds the course of the world only intelligible of a multiplicative of persistent things, of variable relations between them,

^{34 -} Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 354.

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and of events arising out of these changes of mutual relation.

This point concerning the picture of nature as it is revealed to our senses should not be confused with the idea of an inner life within the thing. The two are both possible and in fact are dependent upon each other. There is nothing mysterious about this. It is merely an exposition of that which is. All the logic of the mechanistic position may also be used in Lotze's view. The difference lies in the fact that he goes through the mechanistic interpretation to a larger and more satisfying conception.

It also cannot be said of Lotze's view that this continual reversion to the one source of things hints at complete determinism. Such could not possibly be the case as it is in the "substance" of Leibnitz for it is mind that is behind Lotze's position and all the unlimited possibilities of mind are open to a nature that is understood in this manner. Thus Lotze is careful to keep questions in the realm in which they belong. The problem of determining principles and what gives them their power to determine is that of metaphysics. Evolution rests on this. But it is also apparent in evolution that particular objective laws are in action and this is the question of physical science. The workers in science drive themselves to such a consideration of the way that organic life is derived that they infest the words; matter, mechanism and accident with the meanings that others have for spirit, life and providence and the two become almost synonymous.

^{35 -} Metaphysic, Bk. I, p. 29.

^{36 -} Metaphysic, Bk. II, p. 158.

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Continually we seek in discussion a cause which is the one cause of the universe. Yet as the arguments develop a unity of all things it is difficult to keep away from the conception that everything is simply a phase of the one substance. Lotze strives continually to keep away from that position and succeeds again and again as particular instances are brought into the discussion. After all things have been considered he still wants it made clear that the one did not in a thousand times appear a thousand times, but rather brought together the thousand forms of its existence into the unity of a single development, in which each stage is a condition of the next. The position which holds that things are characterized on a substance basis as it is related to forms which we perceive must not be confused with the position that finds things accessible to one great mind which is able to comprehend all things, not only matter but also ideas, even as we are able to comprehend our limited scope.

Even the most advanced philosophers find it difficult to believe in the existence of anything beyond the experience of the senses and in their emphasis on the senses they become tied down and limited to them. Lotze never denied their validity and their place in the problem of knowledge, but he used them as a factor in a larger whole. The psychologist especially gives intimations of this larger realm, but even he is largely tied down by the physical world and fits in with the efforts of others such as the biologist, astronomer and physicist. Lotze wants

^{37 -} Microcosmus, Bk. IV, p. 454.

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all of these to fit into their respective places, but he does not want to be limited to them. The world of nature is of value just so long as it can tell men about themselves and the minds which they have. Always nature leads to something beyond itself. The mere fact of its existence asserts that fact and it is the theistic philosopher's job to follow through wherever it is possible for him to make reasonable and logical deductions.

The world of sense or objectivity as we see it is entirely insufficient. It deals only with itself and cannot possibly answer any of the questions that concern its reason for being. Since it is a completely contained thing there is no opposition feature to establish its validity and value for that which we know as mind. To set mind behind and within it gives the world of nature a sounding board and a reason for existence as well as the proof of such existence. The cosmological approach is rather a fine measure of argument in the face of the nature that is presented to us. Conditioned beings and events exist and presume an unconditioned and necessary first principle. To deal with the first is to deal with God. Unconditional is merely actual and its recognition will be necessity for us though not in itself necessary. The quality of mind is never lacking and all response is on the basis that mind does exist for the thing that responds.

The question is raised as to whether the absolute one can be identified with the God of religion. Materialism identifies

^{38 -} Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.

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it with matter, but wants matter to remain constant. Lotze asserts that this can be done only by a conscious spirit. Even if matter could be many-in-one, it could not generate consciousness. When the turn is made to idealism which takes matter up into mind there is a more adequate explanation, but still this is not sufficient. There is nothing in these properties of matter to compel us to assume, as the subject of which they are predicated, something in opposition to the reality of spirit. Space is purely mental appearance engendered in us by mental agencies which are not spatial. Space is really in us, not we in space. Material forces express inner nature which may well be spiritual. Thus there is mind outside of us as well as outside the world of nature which contacts our minds and makes it possible for us to perceive this world of nature which is other than ourselves. It is on this basis that the world of nature assumes relationship to something other than itself and thus justifies itself.

In our particular case as human it is an unconsciousness of self that is our limitation and this must not be ascribed to the ultimate Real. This point will be developed in the next two chapters particularly, but it has the most direct relationship to our world of nature. Men and nature are involved in the whole unitary structure and consideration is on the basis that each, though a separate expression, is proceeding from the same source. There are various ways of developing the central position, but they all lead to the One taking in different bits of evidence as they make their way along.

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The ontological view is a cautious one and here Lotze shows his desire to be fair to all aspects. He asserts that what can be implied is not necessarily so. The factor might be an event or order as well as being as it relates itself to the nature ground. But still the predominant emphasis shows an impulse toward the supersensuous, though it cannot be considered a logical conclusion based on positive premises. The accidental view illustrates a side result as an accident and thus a not-necessary factor of fulfillment. But apart from this drift in justification it is necessary. Behind all finally comes the ultimate event or mere matter of fact which is not necessary except in admission by us. Eventually it is discovered that it cannot stand alone, but must depend upon mind to accept it. Thus the cosmological leads to a pluralistic view of science. Religiously it leads to the thought of one supreme Principle to govern and create duality in order that the mind may even know and accept the object.

Finally bare action sets up some definite conclusions that cannot be avoided. There is matter of fact which is eternal and real without deriving from anything else. Man may regard this through experience. There are an undefinable number of real elements with real motion and then finally the reassertion that the laws of nature determine results from the relation of elements and weld them together into a world. To all of this a perfectly definite result always comes for every series is statice. Action leads always to a cause and result of such. The ensuing

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CHAPTER VI

GOD AND LIFE

Here the expression is put on a slightly different basis from that in the preceding chapter. Life cannot especially be termed as on a higher level. Rather it might be said that it is a bit closer to the central unifying factor than nature although nature is just as truly an expression of it. Life is fused into all things. It is an attribute of nature as well as of man and is in many respects the thing that ties together all the distinctive factors of this harmonious existence of the universe. God makes direct expression through the faculties of life though these expressions or the results of them may be best perceived in the characteristics of nature.

Through life the soul of man may have its effect upon the forces of nature and vice versa. An atom of the nervous system may exert an impact and pressure on the soul, or the soul on it, since closer scrutiny discovers ordinary impact and pressure to be not a means to the effect, but only the perceptible form of a 39 far more subtle process between the elements. Thus the soul has within it all the possibilities of the effects in nature and life is the link that brings the two together. All bodily impressions are strokes for the soul which draw forth from its own nature the internal phenomena of sensation. Life is the dynamic

39 - Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 281.

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element that makes motion possible and a smoothly interflowing process between mind and nature. As movement is carried out it is discovered that this movement is merely a development of purposive relations that are not devised by the soul, but are blindly initiated by it since the conditions are already present both in the soul and the realm of nature of which the body is a part. We have said that life is closer to the center than nature in order to make an attempt at classification and a resultant clearer understanding. Lotze says that it is possible to cut through all gradation though this does not especially deny classification. Yet he is trying to make clear the fact that this is a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. Thus he can "conceive a being not merely in some relation to all the rest of the universe, but to every part 40 it in an equally close and gradationless relation".

Life is a concept that transcends all physical limitations that we know and thus is an open door to our minds to understand what Lotze means to say. It is the feature that is all inclusive and beyond which we really need no other if we will give it its most comprehensive scope. It is really the dynamic force. The individual person finds that in order to perceive he must possess in the constitution of his nature a compulsion, a capacity and an impulse to form conceptions and to move the manifold content of his sensation in this kind of combining together and drawing asunder. Philosophy may go beyond to a higher reason

^{40 -} Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 291.

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for this but it is life that is the direct expression of it and life that proceeds from the higher reason thus considered.

Physical science traces these functions and interactions of the life of different things and finds merely a causal chain of processes. We tend to investigate and rate the importance of things in regard to the extent that they conform to the accuracy of this chain. Yet in all of this we are determining for our minds that accuracy of the faculties of life and giving it more and more responsibility in the so-called practical realm. As we do this we simply drive our evidence back to the justification of the source of life and even physical science tends to reach beyond itself for its own explanation.

But life does not always explain these factors of nature as in physical science. It leads to other considerations that are not at all involved in extension as of space. It must be acknowledged "that extension can no more be the predicate of a being than an eddy or vortex is the mode of motion of a single element; both alike can be conceived only as forms of relation between many elements". Thus in considering unextended atoms as a possibility there is opened the way through physical science to the concept of an inner mental life pervading all matter. The one factor of physical science is an expression of life, but the range of life also reaches into all the fields of ideas that are expressed in the mental life.

The question of life always leads to the question of con-

^{41 -} Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 357.

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sciousness and in Lotze it is difficult to discover any direct feature of distinction between consciousness and knowledge. As he does not differentiate clearly here there is the suggestion that consciousness and knowledge must be mutually existent if either is to find expression. Certainly they are very closely related and thus Lotze follows the idea of Kant that all knowledge of other than self is impossible. Here the key to knowledge is self and the possibility of knowledge is determined by the degree to which the self can express the universe, which to Lotze is complete expression. There is reference in this point also to the Greek expression, know thyself. Through this one could come to a final possession of that which was required in an interpretation not only of physical science but also of ethics and all things that were created by thought structure.

As the self expresses itself through motion it does so to a different degree than other features of life do. This activity of life is worked out and expressed on various levels. This Lotze characterizes by a central control as he states that "every finite thing, therefore, possesses the capability of action only in such amount and such quality as it is permitted by the Infinate to contribute to the realization of the whole". All direction is always from the one source and life is the expressive form of such direction. The thing that makes the self into an individualistic form is the soul. Lotze feels that it is of eternal and imperishable duration and as such is a definite sub-

42 - Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 382.

L. V 0 - 10 - 010 10 10 - 01 ę ject. Thus it acts as distinctive and creative though still a part of the larger whole. It is on this point that strong personalistic theories are later to hang their argument. They take this suggestion of Lotze's and develop it far beyond any position that he gave it. Yet he made a place for it and room for such development and to see this is to realize its importance in the theistic view. We can never say that Lotze is a final authority, but certainly it is true that he did a brilliant job with what he had and made possible even more clearly than ever had been done before the conditions for advancement along this line.

Every physical process that takes place between two elements is linked to the mental by life and is an event within the Eternal, on whose constant presence all possibility of action depends. Thus the slightest movement within the organic structure is a development of the Infinite himself. Carried out to the higher level of the soul it may then be considered that the soul does not originate in the body or anything else, but rather it goes forth from the substance of the Infinite with no less fullness of reality than all actual nature brought forth from the same source. We are overwhelmed and astounded by the numberless ways of God. His creative hand is everywhere and his work results in the orderly and progressive practices with which we are familiar. Growth is an essential to life and it is through that method that value finds its place especially for the self. We may follow the direction of these ways and approximate the truth 43 - Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 391.

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of certain theories. But just as we are limited to an incomplete knowledge of natural phenomena so we are limited in our study of the spiritual order of the universe.

When we come to an impasse we must turn to the coworking (Mitwirkung) of God and depend on the eternal action and reaction between God and nature of which our bodies and thus a large part of our investigation are a part. We cannot study life as though it were complete in itself as dissevered from the divine energy. We must consider it not only in the sphere that we recognize, but also as being effected sympathetically according to regulative principles by this coworking of God. This is the understanding by which vitality is injected into nature in our thinking to become essential to the whole view. It is the realization that the very simplest beings are filled with life. Thus the combination of these beings which result in the outward form of lifeless matter is merely an expression of this seat of an inner life capable of entering with the most varied forms of feeling into the peculiarity of every situation into which the changeful course of nature threw them, or in which a more persistent process of growth retained them.

The attempt is made primarily in this excursion into life to explore the sphere of means rather than that of ends. The way of procedure is through conscious sensation in order that discovery may be made of the true action of continuously more intelligent life. Thus the mechanistic expression of life in the forms that

^{44 -} Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 394.

. 10 ----· · * we observe it is the collection of all the instrumental forms in which God has willed that created beings shall act on one another with their unknown natures, and that all their states shall be welded into the endless chain of a world history. The link of life thus makes it complete. It satisfies both the requirements of physical science and metaphysics. Nowhere is mechanism the essence of the matter; but nowhere does being assume another form of finite existence except through it; as we have not other gods beside God, so we need no other form beside this universal form 45 of action in nature.

The purpose of life is to carry through in interpretation the great real world which we know and to do so in such a way that it is merely a reflection of the little world with all variations and kinds considered. This little world is the Microcosm and it is on this that the system of Lotze is developed. Man himself is a reflection of this fundamental nature of the universe and different forms of it are carried into all phases of the universe so that it finally reflects the whole in every particular instance. From this one seed of reality do all things come and in such a way that they follow the course of life and are expressed with its vitality. Lotze builds on the fragment of unity that is all inclusive and adaptible to every form. As life is the agent of activity so the minuteness may become an entire—ty.

Lotze further moves to a discussion of life in the social

^{45 -} Microcosmus, Bk. III, p. 400.

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sphere. He raises the problems of the methods of culture and how it developed from nature. But this discussion centers around the home which is the root of man's physical existence. The pastoral mode of life brings conditions that are the most favorable to the development of fine living and it is the home that makes possible in man's mind the possession of his environment on a spiritual plane. He is at home mentally as well as physically and his life moves with a steady purpose. The spiritual life is brought down to earth and begins to live in each local situation. Moral relations become practical and are essential to the well-being of the members of home relationship. Every career though it may find its widest expression outside the home environment takes the home as its base of operations and finds the consummation of that career in the development of home life. Sociologically the home has a strong effect particularly in regard to the physical environment and spiritually it is the strongest tie that man knows in the realm of personalities.

An individual has to feel that he fits in somewhere in the whole sociological process that is set in motion by the home and then includes the institutions that are imposed upon the home. When he realizes that he is part of this unbroken stream of humanity in the world's history he is stirred to activity in its behalf and thus progress results. This is not only true of the conscious realization that he has but also of the necessity that is brought about by such conditions. The individual is confronted with responsibility and conditions that might almost be considered on a mechanical level although the same causes do not

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always produce the same effects. Yet as the conditions follow the same general rule for all they become a part of a larger plan that includes both the realm of nature and that of man's relationships.

Lotze takes up another aspect of life as he moves from the social sphere to the inner life. Here he finds a certain degree of confusion particularly in regard to the long range problems. In small situations individuals may be said to follow more or less of a pattern, but when it comes to the great aims and purposes that drive them there is quite a degree of difference especially when individuals have not taken the time to think through these larger goals. Doubts are raised as to the place of such goals and purposes. As man is generally regarded he is merely a transitory natural product and to dwell on greater ends is to waste time. Lotze argues this out and discovers that into the orderly progression of the natural life of man come many stimulating and unexpected insights that bring about spontaneous judgments. As these are made and reflections follow there comes another level of consideration. This goes beyond the natural and looks to a supersensuous world that will provide for the resulting ideas that cannot be included in the natural realm.

Although at first we tend to see man as merely a product of nature/s mechanism if we follow out this procedure of trying to see things as a unity yet we soon realize that man is not produced by nature's process. Reality lies in the unity that produces both man and nature in such a way that they are to a large extent parallel and interrelated. We realize that laws alone

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never in any case produce a real being; they produce such only by means of a preexistent real, actual, manifold, and primary which 46 subordinates itself and its working to these laws. The effects and laws are both dependent on this real which is reflected in every being.

Ultimately the final, the most comprehensive and the fundamental fact of reality is the unity and inner coherence of creative nature, which did not throw into that realm of necessary laws an unconnected multitude of examples but rather the hidden germ of an ordered world expressed through life that the laws might develop it. The principle is one of separation in order that the real may be a workable force in each incident and at the same time an independent entity. As Lotze says. "it is this living reality that has been the subject of our consideration". In this he has tried to find man and his special nature as contrasted with the equally special natures of other beings. But in this study there have been encountered many things within the human creature that are not first produced in him. They reflect another reality. When the attempt is made to connect the whole of human nature with the whole of reality great difficulty is encountered.

Human nature is at the head of an animal world on a planet in space. Here we are divided mentally from this animal world by a seemingly insurmountable barrier. We follow great plans

^{46 -} Microcosmus, Bk. VI, p. 119. 47 - Microcosmus, Bk. VI, p. 120.

and ideas that lead us out beyond our early reckonings, but then we are constantly falling short of the ideals discovered. We are perplexed by an inability to understand that which is often intimated to us, but then Lotze has a suggestion for this also. "We know not what there is hidden from us in the countless stars which touch our lives only when a ray from them reaches our eyes by night; how then should we know our place in the whole great universe, with only a fraction of which we are acquainted?" The only reasonable way out of this seeming incongruity is a study of history and the connection of ideas that has gradually been attained by the intellectual labor of the human race. Through this process Lotze attempts to unite the scattered threads of reflection and reconcile many apparent contradictions.

In all of these processes of life Lotze admits the place of the teleological. It is a system of means adapted to ends. He asserts that the adaptation is proof of the wisdom of a personal supreme Being who sustains the world. Others would use this same point to prove opposing arguments. They grant that the relation between an effect and the sum of the causes that actually bring it to pass is invariably that of a nicely adjusted system of means to its end. They see merely completeness in the mechanical order and there rest content. The question, why, does not seem to concern them. Yet how can we state that such an end is sought after?

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^{48 -} Microcosmus, Bk. VI, p. 121.

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whatever of actual facts. The question is; was there choice which is essential to design? The suggestion then is that perhaps the ultimate Reality is entitled in its original character to predicates of harmony, inner agreement and adjustment of means to ends. When things destroy each other they oppose this view and suggest merely a polytheistic view of different purposes. Yet teleology accepts the ordinary view of science which holds to the reality of given elements, forces and laws. This also though not completely solvent by logical arguments is adequate to the purpose of the whole view of life which leads always to God for its ultimate source.

49 - Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.

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CHAPTER VII

GOD AND MAN

Whereas we have been discussing largely the character of the physical world and the way that it is related to God and to man now we come to the discussion of man as distinct from the physical world although never completely detached from it. It is necessary of course to see and understand man through his physical body yet his capacity for mental development is the primary feature of this physical creature and all discussion will be undertaken with that in mind. Lotze spends many pages in discussing man in the animal realm. He considers the Darwinian theory and moves from brute to man as he sees symbolism and beauty of form appear to a continuously more advanced degree. In this discussion under the title of man we will also consider and primarily so Lotze's section on mind. It is man as thinker that we would know for here it is that we get closest to God. We have God in nature, but we take another step in His direction when we consider God in mind.

The emphasis is on the idea in the soul of a man that grows and expands into the variety of manifold activities which are its natural results. We are not trying to get outside the normal realm which we have been discussing but rather we are trying to find the creative agency that works within that realm. To discover the beginning of its existence is impossible. Lotze says

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
that we must regard existence as a precipitate. Its genesis never can be understood but we can come to know it through our ideas as they relate themselves to the ultimate Idea. Thus the real is the Idea embodied in a manner which we cannot understand in the form of "efficacious substantiality". To seek this Idea through ourselves is our purpose.

Man has the ability to unite and regulate a complexus of action, passion and reaction. He is creative in this activity as no other form of mental life known to us. He produces a thoughtimage in which he is able to reproduce the content of things.

This is possible since that content is one expression of the term idea while the form of the thought-image is the other. The double meaning of idea is carried through on the basis that there is a permanent identical meaning that can be expressed in a boundless variety. Unity is still the keynote to this whole system of thought.

Yet mind is far more than thinking. There are some things that are intelligible only to the one who has experienced them. They cannot be justified or originated by thought. They stand alone as intimations of that which is just beyond comprehension and yet they have a reality all their own and it fits in with the reality of the whole. We find that we cannot express them, but surely we can know them ourselves. These considerations lead to the realization of individuality. At some point every person stands completely alone and to a certain degree this may also be

50 - Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 548.



said of every animal mind. Each one is a vitally active complete idea which is distinct from every other and a perfect unit in itself. But Lotze attempts to show how man is not merely a higher stage of animal life, but a distinct psychic life that exists in a purely independent relationship to God. That is, it is independent of the rest of the world, but no thing can be independent of God by the very nature of the fact of existence.

Man as he takes in sensation is not merely indifferently yielding a definite content to perception. Attached to each sensation is an element of feeling which measures in terms of pain and pleasure the value of the stimulation received for our individual existence. It is this distinct ability that mind has which in a more intensified degree leads to the creativeness of mental life. Creativity then is the mark of that which is other than external nature or inner nature. Our most satisfactory knowledge of this then must come through ourselves.

We gradually come to the realization that man is purposely fitted for reaction that follows the general pattern. He comes to distinguish between the true and the untrue as they are related to the ultimate Truth. Here again as he carries out the almost instinctive processes he is following a line that has a correspondence with mechanical action and yet cannot be produced by that which we know outwardly as mechanical action. The realm of the physical sciences is a guide to our thinking and yet it cannot be made a substitute for thought. The realization is once more upon us that we are working in the same general way as the forces of the physical world, having come from the same source,

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and yet we are distinctively different as we approach the very na-

Once it is understood that man is available to Truth in the primary instance, then it follows that afterwards he is aroused by experience to search for and discover individual truths. He finds himself and begins a process that leads to maturity and wisdom. Now he attempts to find definite reasons for this thing that he has already experienced. The emphases of culture become real to him and he tries to relate the beauty of the particular to the wonder of the whole. But in this process man often commits one of his greatest errors. He looks for an external cause when there is no need for one. The inner cause is by far the more real and it needs no elaborate explanation for ordinary usage. Of course it baffles when the attempt is made to explain it completely and yet it is the most positive thing that man may know.

A distinct feature of man's nature is his progressiveness. He is adaptible to the highest concept of growth. Not only does the organism continue to develop along physical lines, but the relationship between organisms and minds is furthered and heightened by man's ability to find for himself and for others ways of living that lead to individual happiness and a greater degree of universal fellowship. Although we may question many of the particular instances that arise we must admit the development over a long period. Once we have seen this also the particulars begin to have meaning for this longer view. Man finds that he

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must continually conform more adequately to the laws of the universe both physical and moral. As he conforms and becomes more adaptible he finds more valid propositions that once more lead him on the pathway to truth.

There is never the purpose on the part of Lotze to deny man his freedom. It is only as man exercises his fullest prerogative in the matter of choice that he comes to realize his own potentialities and how close they are to the image of God in which he was made. Choice develops character and responsibility in the mind as the mind is trained in choice. There could be no training and no growth if the issue of freedom were omitted. Man's body grows under the laws of the physical world while man's mind grows under the laws of freedom. Each of these two phases has a process of mechanism which is rather limited in the former, but finds the widest possible range in the latter.

It is essential as we have discussed before that man's mental life conform in many respects to the physical world. They both have the same source and there exists a certain parallelism and interaction between the two. Thus there appear in man's mind certain generic notions that make it possible for him to understand the cosmos since the notions in his conception and the principles which are the cosmos are one and the same. This is not a complete function in that it is given over completely to the mind. It is rather a system of growth and achievement that may never result in completeness and yet has eternal purposes and values that may be partially understood. But eventually it is based on a few principles which can be regarded as truths

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oped so early and so invariably in every mind that all other knowledge is acquired by their help and their influence. They do not necessarily appear out of what we would consider as nowhere. They are responses to environment and the resulting sensation in such a way that nature and the bodily function is also necessary to them. That is, they are products of the mind of God both through the mind of man and nature.

As man continually reflects on these characteristics and abilities that he has he comes to this realization that they come from a source that is greater than he. He obtains insights into that which he already has and he reinterprets in an objective manner his innermost qualities. Gradually as he catches scattered visions of truth and comes to realize that they tend to fit together there arises in him the dawn of a knowledge of Truth. As Lotze says, "this dawn may grow to a fuller day under favorable conditions". In order to bring in the day certain conditions must exist. The individual must be satisfied in regard to the fundamental bases of existence and then he must go on to a desire for the enrithment of life through beauty. When these things are cared for there is opportunity for the quiet impulse of investigation to work. The person begins to lose himself in the course of events in order that he may discover to some extent where they lead to. He becomes conscious of the comprehensiveness and inevitableness of the network of relations which em-

^{51 -} Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 680.

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braces all things.

The area of proof is definitely broadened and we see how it may range far from its starting point. Though the road which our thought takes is different from that along which the event travels we discover that the two always converge. It soon appears to us that in the objective and thought-realized world the connection between all parts of the world is so intimate that every point may be reached from every other in a thousand ways, the dominion of this all-pervading connection being nowhere interrupted. Of course it is also realized that this connection does not extend to human culture. That is far more blundering and errorstricken and expresses growth in the adaptibility of mind which is characterized by choice. However certain general rules still may be applied in such a way that they reveal a degree of connection and conformity and thought as it reaches out for understanding is really going back to its fundamental origin and source of creativity. The distinction is that now it is approaching this with an independent thought structure built on struggle for understanding.

Upon the basis of all this connection we build a world of joy or sorrow and here we are introduced to a level of expression that is far more flexible and intensified. Things are judged much more upon this basis. The consideration of happiness is brought to bear and we find that all the other developments that have been made in the field of thought are of no consequence if

^{52 -} Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 681.

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they do not lead to some degree of happiness. This is the chance that man has to say, "what of it"? No matter how we try to ignore it in our scientific discussion it cannot be avoided and we must come back to the realization that here is where all action starts. It was Lotze's ability to recognize the tremendous importance of this factor that lead to his discussions in the beginning of modern psychology.

The question arises as to whether man is going to react with vigorous enterprise or passive submission to fate. In this respect all of our philosophizing is of value for it tells each individual for himself the conditions under which he is living and what it means to him in the long run. Thus it has often been said that if we know how a man acts we can to a certain extent tell his philosophy of life. The practical emphasis is quite apparent. One cannot carry out logical results always from the evidence that is set forth, but the general rule is yet in force. If we try to apply it too strictly then we are getting into the area of individual personality and this is the consideration of Lotze's whole concept of the universe. If one could know completely all the whys and wherefores of individual personality he would have insight into the very character of the ultimate Personality or God himself.

In spite of our lack of knowledge in many respects yet there do exist in man certain drives that keep him seeking in the face of almost countless failures. He is animated by faith in the existence of truth. His difficulty comes when he tries to discover in what this truth consists. To do that he must use investiga-

* (1 € , * comes a persistent effort and man seems to be characterized by a duty or obligation. He must go on or lose himself in non-activity. Lotze shows two conditions of man's ability to carry out his desires for truth. First he has the power of experience to develop and second he has the original presence of the germ upon which this power operates. These are equally important and the germ is essential to the power even though many affirm that the only requirement is experience. He merely says that experience is an expression of force that lies behind it.

Along with duty comes the idea of ought and man is face to face with the moral question. Man is seeking not only truth and happiness but affiliated with those, worth, which gives further strength to his position in the life process. But just why and how there is demanded so much from us by our inner Idea it is hard to say. Kant believed that he had found a universal formula for moral action, but he was candid enough to admit that he did not know exactly why it had such binding authority over man. This question has too often been put outside the realm of personal interest. Lotze felt that it was essential to consider man's desire for happiness and look at things in the light of whether they were pleasant or not to his inner sensitivity. "Somewhere or other, this external apparatus and all its orderly sequence of events must find its goal in an inner world of pleasure and of 54 finite enjoyment."

^{53 -} Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 687. 54 - Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 694.

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By this shift of emphasis to the criterion of enjoyment Lot
ze does not mean to depreciate the laws that he has so often affirmed. He maintains absolutely the indispensableness of an ordered mechanism. But he feels that it cannot be that all reality
exists only for the sake of existing. "Must we believe that the
universe is so taken up with ceremony that it is concerned with
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nothing but the realization of formal conditions?" The answer
lies in the consideration of worth. Specific feeling in every
case is the immediate indivisible transference into the language
of sensibility of the worth peculiar to each particular case.
There is an interaction by which the value of a thing is measured
as well as the mere fact of quantity and existence, We are constantly constrained by the inherent worth of things.

Every consideration of the world of fact and its interaction refers finally to conscience for a decision. Man moves as he is advised and warned by an inner sensitivity to the inherent value of a thing or an event. It is this function that is the first step into the mtaphysical realm. Much investigation, controversy and elaboration may develop from it, but the key factor is the simple act of each person's opinion, either more or less controlled and developed, in regard to any specific function. As opinion is exercised over a period of time under definite conditions of education on the basis of that which has gone before it becomes in many respects standard. It continues to exercise its own prerogative and yet it comes to know that certain general

^{55 -} Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 692.


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rules are true and the attempt is made to follow these. This gradually cuts down the danger of excess along lines that are destructive to personality and leads to an acquaintance with the greater good. The alternative is that if the wrong choice is made it leads to the greater evil. One cannot affirm this to be true in every particular instance for the fact of growth and the necessary prerequisites of freedom of the mind set up the conditions for non-adherence to the general rule. Yet the general rule prevails and the development of man through history bears out this point.

As man puts his mind to the greater good he begins to elaborate those things that lead to a strong central good or the purpose of divinely inspired life. Here are all the conditions for humanism and yet they are worked out and possible only on the basis of a theistic premise. Both bodily and spiritual life are in all cases ultimately subordinate to general laws that are appropriate to each. Although man may develop and nurture himself within the range of these laws yet the divine Principle is felt through the laws in everything that he does. That there may be a reward toward which man may work and which justifies his efforts there must be God first. This is the moral imperative that gives man his place in the universal order. As man recognizes this fact and then moves out to an understanding of it with consciously directed activity he comes into the realm of devotion which will be considered in the next chapter. He may be fulfill—

^{56 -} Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.

Я 4 . | | | - ing all the conditions of human existence and achievement, but it is not until he makes the break into the recognition of the central Good toward which he is striving that he may fully experience the joys of a devoted spirit.



CHAPTER VIII

GOD AND DEVOTION

The discussion of devotion is the attempt to undertake an independent philosophy. The study of man and his world through psychology and physical science subsists on the level of interdependence. Connection is the primary factor in this ordered realm. But in devotion there is an entirely new and independent seeking on the part of each particular individual. Connection is accepted and then relegated to the background except as it serves to illustrate. Religion is the foremost expression and the keynote of religion is faith in God and His goodness. Man knows that God is and that God is able to do something about life. Then it is man's supreme desire to contemplate and find a semblance of understanding in the personality of God. It is an attempt at communication between mind and mind as they are the essence of personality both as related to man and to God.

Faith is not the same as science or moral principles. It comes out of first impressions rather than rationalization and implies a supersensuous. We have moved in stages of logical progression through the conditions of ordinary existence and now we are dealing in direct expression between man and God. While it is true in a scientific study of life that the grounds of factual knowledge are first to be considered, it is often just the opposite in man's direct experience. At times he may see very deeply


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into the truth of a thing and then have to retrace his steps in order to justify himself to his own reason and that of others.

But first of all faith is a deep inner experience. It may be experienced in regard to science, art or morality, but it does not consist of the principles of these things. It is a field of expression unto itself.

In order to find the grounds for faith we must first carry out the philosophic advice of ancient Greece as in a preceding section, know thyself. Once we have done this we come to a new recognition of values. But the recognition of "I" must assume an opposition reference point and this gives us the possibility of the knowledge of God. The opposition is in an inner state or idea and not in outside factuality. Thus God may be personal and yet not limited to the finite. Our inner states do not have to conform to external law. Yet in us as individuals the stimulus of outside reality is needed for the recognition of our personality. The Infinite does not need this. God is an eternally active thought. The individual also has this to a certain extent. He can say, "I am the subject and object of my thinking", and is able in one sense to stand apart from his world. He is dependent upon his world for the conditions of growth but not for the real thing that is growing.

The idea of mine is given through pleasure and pain as we react to these outside forces, but mine is within. It is only that stimula ab extra has an effect upon it. The Infinite would create stimuli by his own mind even as he does for us through a way that we can know it as human beings.



The whole idea of creation is put forth on this level of mind. God did not create the first conditions and then leave it alone to go on as best it might. Further he did not create out of something. Creation is simply the development of the Divine Nature and it does not imply a law above God according to which He develops. Activity founds law not vice versa. There is no activity behind and above God. He is not the exemplification of a pre-existing conception. It is not only possible but necessary to begin and end with the one Being. Yet God is not empty abstraction. Our physical science is a continuous affirmation of that fact. God is the all-in-all of qualities and attributes. A term which implies prededing God is impossible and unsound to science and metaphysics. All things are possible and all means that which proceeds from God for there can be no contrast with anything else. Eternal validity was founded though the founder cannot be explanatorially named or distinguished from the truth. Unconditional affirmation is given by God and recognized by Him from the first. Theoretical are distinguished from moral truths, but both are within a sphere that holds them in essential unity.


We easily distinguish between what we think and what is real, but this is not true of God. How could God distinguish between thoughts as to one that is real and one that is not? God's thoughts are reality in all perspective and if many of them are expressed in a form that is concrete and orderly to us that by no means denies their thought source. The complete thought of this world must already have had in God this temporal order and arrangement which realization is alone supposed to give to it.

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Creation is of spirits alone. Thus God creates finite spirits and causes to arise in them cosmic thoughts as external perceptions for the divine Mind.

God permits thought that is His to become thought of other spirits and thus His continual influence and operation cause His own cosmic thoughts to arise and figure as the appearance of an outer world surrounding them and capable of being perceived by them. Nothing can exist for itself and otherwise than the thought of another spirit, except a spirit itself. Spirits alone can be called substances. Things are mere appearances in the minds of spirits. This world of things that we observe need not be the only world. Things are not real or created in themselves. must go back through spirits to God Himself. It is the seeking mind that comes to the realization of these things. A mind that has once been aroused to reflection cannot rest. It must go on in the study of human existence to ask questions concerning its origin, its place and significance in the world, its end and its future life. It begins to work toward constructing a spiritual order and no matter how slight or diverted its contribution it comes to feel that each duty that it fulfills in this respect has its final ground of obligation in its correspondence with the end to which it is destined. This is not mere self development, that which takes place in growth from the past to the future, but rather a movement toward a goal which is very definitely set

57 - Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.



before us.

Search in this fashion is a common and indestructible feature of the human mind as it consists in the idea of valid and binding truth and the sense of the universal righteousness with a universal standard by which all reality must be tried. The one capacity that lifts man irrevocably above the other stages of life is that of becoming conscious of the Infinite. This does not come from the influence of experience, a factor which would tend to destroy its unique quality, but it has its origin in the vary nature of our being and only requires the favoring conditions of experience for its development. This leads us not only to a consciousness of our own weakness as limited personalities. but also a belief that as personalities we are called to an imperishable work in the world. With this realization the conviction of an intimate connection between our earthly life and the mysterious whole of this universal frame no longer interferes with our care for the small tasks of daily life.

But the field of faith offers many pitfalls particularly in the realm of personal experience. The unsteadiness of our thoughts and feelings so seldom allows us to hold fast that which belongs to our peace of mind and makes it sound on in deep unbroken harmony. We find that we must constantly revive and reestablish the grounds of our excursions into this higher realm.

And yet the moments are so rare when we can feel the touches of

^{58 -} Microcosmus, Bk. V, p. 713.
59 - Microcosmus, Bk. VI, p. 115.

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that supersensuous world as a living truth in our own lives. The thing that ties those moments together and catches up the sagging middles is a strong conviction based on carefully thought through premises. We can depend on this if we are willing to develop it at all times, in moments of leisure as well as periods of directed study. It may be the highest endeavour of man's consciously directed mental activity.

Here is the full joyous assurance of the truth of faith in God. It is the subjection in lowly humility of all one's own strength to the grace of God. Christianity fits quite normally into this concept and offers infinite stimulus to the understanding without binding it down to a narrow circle of thought; and to the heart it offers full as much. The essential truth of Christianity is particularly applicable. It is that the sole truth and the source of reality with all its laws is something of which the eternal worth must be felt in order to be known for the link between experience and mental reflection must be maintained. From the reality thus known through feeling, man's understanding of himself comes to play a very direct part in his search for an understanding of God.

Then man must join his understanding with that of others in order that he may have an ever wider approach. Thus he gives himself to an organized communal group which is directing its attention to this one phase of normal life. The church has its clear function in a society of those who are redirecting themselves to life with a vision of betterment in mind. By better-

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ment is meant the driving of the will in the way that reason has pointed out as it has discovered the real character of the universe. Under this condition the continued existence of the church is desired as an objective reality in which the religious life of the individual person issues forth, finding therein both a guarantee that its efforts are well directed and also a spiritual comfort as well as edification.

This activity on man's part is an expression of the fundamental ground on which all activity endures. It is possible because of the supersensuous order of the world. This order consists in the totality of the reciprocal action between things taking place in the world at every moment. The actions are not produced, changed and organized by a multitude of impulses running backwards and forwards between things, but they themselves being comparable in meaning and hence subject to universal laws, produce in one another impulses that become realized without the help of any mediating mechanism and arrange themselves according to their meaning (as constituents of the world's content which stand in need of one another) in that intellectual order which is valid for them but does not exist between them.

The emphasis is on value and not on existence for existence is merely a subsidiary attribute of value. Existence is the condition that we know and must express, but it is a limited function. Value is first the reason for existence and then its interpretation. As such it is limited by nothing and is the realm

^{60 -} Microcosmus, -Bk. IX, p. 641.

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in which God subsists having no form or character other than that given by God's intelligence. Because we are intelligent beings we are able to exist as beings and at the same time to be intimately associated with God's realm as intelligences. It is true that existence and value are two distinct and separate concepts, but existence is possible within value and value cannot be confined to mere existence. Existence is limited, value is unlimited. God is value and expresses Himself through existences. Man carries out the same function except in his case the realm of existence is imposed to such a great extent upon him in the interest of growth that value is simply a directing agent and creative force and not a complete control. God uses value to an ultimate degree, but never voluntarily gives up the form of existence both for Himself as pure form and for His world as the content of paraticulars.

Yet how may we know this? The only way is through the link that we have with God through the value insights and judgments of our own minds. Thus the Infinite is actively efficacious in all individual minds, as a power which in the whole spirit-world has assumed innumerable harmonious modes of existence as it brings to pass the exhibition of these same universal laws by the totality of the various world pictures which arise in various individuals. Also the events that occur within the world of the individual are exercised by the Infinite with such accord in all that the same things or the same world of things appear to all as a common object of intuition, an external reality common to all and connect-

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Reality must be related to the Infinite though it is to be found in each particular instance. It is that which we attribute to things as the points from which action sets out and in which it is consummated. Thus it is dependent upon the nature of that to which it is to belong; it is the being of that which exists for self. Then also there is self-existence. Mentality has its expression from this point for the individual. Thus in this way we can attribute to reality various degrees of intensity. And so it follows that all things really possess in different degrees of perfection that selfhood by which an immanent product of the Infinite becames what we call real.

This higher level of self in a personal being, that is the mind or ego that apprehends itself, is passive in feeling and active in willing and is one in the remembrance in which it brings past experiences together. As such we can regard it as a similatude of that which is the nature of beings endowed with realness or we can believe that we find the thing directly, itself, the nature of all realness in this living self-existence. This is the key to devotion. That we are distinct and yet a part of the greater whole, that we may live in and at the same time observe as though from without the world that we face, that we may experience and then direct our experience to consecrated expression that leads to the goal of all life, communion with the Infinite. The factor that makes our position unique is that we are able to

61 - Microcosmus, Bk. IX, p. 641.

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come closer to the fundamental nature of God as beings of life that are like unto His own person.

Then we come to know that we are minds which continue immanent in the Infinite as states, activities or modifications of It. Yet we exist for self and in this self-existence have the fullest realness which we do not obtain by being detached from the Infinite for apart from the Infinite self-existence becomes incomprehensible. There is then no ground on which the self can depend. There is no law precedent to all reality. It is only the living mind that is and nothing is before it or external to it. self does not depend upon opposition to validate its selfhood as the essence of all personality. The ego stands not because there is a non-ego, but because it consists in an immediate self-existence which allows for contrast wherever it appears. Through self-consciousness we come to realize this self-existence as our knowledge increases. But knowledge through personal consciousness is possible only through the influences of that cosmic whole which the finite being is not and which therefore may be called the non-ego. This does not mean that it must be contrasted with something foreign, but simply that it does not have within itself the conditions for its existence.

This limitation is not true of the Infinite. Thus it alone has the possibility of self-existence which needs neither to be initiated not to be continuously developed by something not itself, but which maintains itself within itself with spontaneous action that is eternal and had no beginning. Further the element

¢ and the second s -17 --- 1 of personality is realized to the fullest extent in the infinite Mind. Perfect personality is in God only, to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof. The finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this personality which we have but it is a limit and a hindrance to its development.

But man must have the conditions of free choice in order to possess personality. It is his growth in choice that makes possible an advance in personality. God is related to this in the three activities of creation, conservation and government. He is willing and able to set the conditions and help man to grow within them, but He will not destroy man's capacity and opportunity for growth. God is good as He wills that man shall grow. Man is good as his will is directed toward his own growth and consequently that of others. "To thine own self be true and it will follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any It is not the actions but the will from which the actions proceed that is the good. Good and good things do not exist as such independent of the feeling, willing and knowing mind. the individual has obligations in every sphere. Living love unfolds itself in one movement which is in the three aspects of the good that is its end. Love creates the impulse and the conformity to law that keeps the impulse within the path that leads toward the end of the good. Both love and the scientific atti-

^{62 -} Microcosmus, Bk. IX, p. 688.

^{63 -} Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Sc. 3, L. 75. 64 - Microcosmus, Bk. IX, p. 722.

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tude are necessary to the attempt at reaching the whole good.

"For the universal, the class and the state of things belong to the mechanism into which the Supreme articulates itself; the true reality that is and ought to be is not matter and is still less idea, but is the living personal spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has created. They only are the place in which good and good things exist; to them alone does there appear an extended material world by the forms and movements of which the thought of the cosmic whole makes itself intelligible through intuition to every finite mind."

65 - Microcosmus, Bk. IX, p. 728.

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CHAPTER IX

THEORY

Now that the attempt has been made to establish Lotze's place in history and his system of thought it is proper that the attempt should be made to see in some sense his relationship to the present and his interpretation for the future. In this chapter the emphasis will be on the ideas concerning theory which have been carried on from his thought or have been developed because of a stimulus that originated in his mind. Any thinker who drops his system into the stream of human thought so that it stirs the surface and causes ripples to go out in every direction must be interpreted in the light of those ripples and the effect they may have in the history of man's development as well as the experience of man's relationship to the Infinite.

Those ripples will meet the ripples of other systems and the result will often be a mixture of ideas, but still the original effect will be present and it is to the purpose of picking that out that this part is dedicated. This does not mean that it will be a complete analysis, but rather that it will be suggestive of the widespread influence of this man and the essential truth of what he had to say. His system was one of personal idealism and he held to the principle of self-consciousness as the highest attribute of life. His was a spiritualistic universe and mind was the reality in that all the physical categories were merely the expression of mind.

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John Buckham of the Pacific School or Religion brings out the emphasis that Lotze put on personality as he aided, abetted and strengthened the understanding of its metaphysical basis. Buckham further shows how Lotze was carrying out the structural principles laid down by Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz and Kant as well as Lotze. This was a dominant note in Lotze for he brought out carefully man's relationship to nature and also to God on this basis of personality. Here he was showing the important psychological principles that were appearing in some instances for the first time in his thinking. But he could not ascribe full personality to man. Albert C. Knudson of Boston University agrees with Lotze when he says that perfect personality is possible only to the Absolute. Since the characteristic is also possible to man and yet is not perfect in man the situation is provided for in which man may be made in the image of God and yet be limited to his earthly function.

W. R. Matthews, a Dean of King's College, London, has responded to an essential theory of personality as put forth by Lotze. He agrees with the idea that the nature of personality 68 does not consist in the contrast between ego and non-ego. This allows for the contrast but does not make it essential as those who emphacize the reality of matter affirm. The whole question of the supremacy of mind or matter is involved here and Lotze is trying to make room for both with mind inclusive of matter.

^{66 -} Buckham, Contemporary American Theology, p. 96 & p. 100.

^{67 -} Knudson, The Doctrine of God, p. 305. 68 - Matthews, God in Christian Experience, p. 175.

Edgar 5. Brightman of Boston University, who along with Knudson and others follows in the line of Bowne, a student of Lotze, gives Lotze a leading place in personalistic thought. He cites the theory of Lotze that the whole universe is personal as it is made up of a mind or minds and their experiences. Then he lists outstanding thinkers who have followed in the same line as well as several who preceded Lotze. After Lotze come T. H. Green, James Ward, McTaggart, Eucken, Royce, Niss Calkins, Ladd, Bowne, Richegardson and others. Brightman goes on later to show that Lotze brought out more explicit thinking about values than had been apparent up until his time. He agrees with Lotze when the position that soul (mind) does not exist when thinking is not going on is 70 taken. And he shows how John Laird backs Lotze up on this point.

Mackenzie, a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge and Professor in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, relates Lotze to his day as he cites the ideas that are exceedingly pertinent and important. He speaks of the fact that 71 Lotze was strongly interested in psychology. He refers to the fine development of the stages of modern history and their influore ence on culture. He mentions the aspects of consciousness as 73 they give us clues to our inner identity. He relates how Lotze is able to develop the idea of value without giving it a hedonismal to sense. And finally he shows the clear view of politics that

^{69 -} Brightman, -An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 138.

^{70 -} Ibid., p. 175.

^{71 -} Mackenzie, An Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 151.

^{72 - &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 81.

 $^{73 - \}overline{1bid}$, p. 217. 74 - $\overline{1bid}$, p. 267.

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Lotze shows in his comments on votes. These are all in their own way a contribution to the fund of knowledge for this man and particularly here they show Lotze's relationship to a time and a place that was not his own.

In a broad survey discussion of American philosophies of religion by Wieman and Meland, Lotze appears as an outstanding figure of influence. They speak of a tradition which shapes American religious thought in the theory of idealism and show how it moved through Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte, 76 Schelling, Hegel to Lotze. He is compared with Renouvier in France and McTaggart in England as being the particular exponent of personalistic theories at that time. His objectivity of value is granted by Whitehead, Wieman, Spaulding and in a sense Dewey 78 of Harvard, Chicago, Princeton and Columbia respectively. Idealists have been primarily concerned with the social problem and in this respect Hocking, Royce, Calkins and Dewey emphacize Hegel 79 but see the strong influence of Lotze also.

William James of Harvard pointed out Lotze's well-known proof of monism from the fact of interaction between finite things. Universes of distinct beings while distinct must belong together beforehand as co-implicated already. Natures have an inborn mutual reference each to each. James puts Lotze on a par with Royce here and says though that both have a difficulty that

^{75 -} Mackenzie, An Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 382.

^{76 -} Wieman & Meland, American Philosophies of Religion, p. 39.

^{77 -} Ibid., p. 134.

^{78 - &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 320.

^{79 -} Ibid., p. 320/.

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keeps them from complete satisfaction. They work on the basis of 80 an argument that is purely verbal in his mind. Conger of the University of Minnesota points out that there are several leading thinkers in America as well as England that have followed Lotze as Bowne has done. He illustrates with G. T. Ladd of Yale (1842-1920), H. Sturt of Oxford (1863-), G. A. Coe in his Psychology 81 of Religion and G. H. Howison (1834-1916). He also stresses Lotze's classifications of the fine arts as relative freedom from 82 the imitation of nature and from utility.

Hocking of Harvard grants Lotze's affirmation that human law only exists when it is thought of. This leads to the thought that nature and its laws can only exist in a mind. A law, a way of acting, is a generality, a universal, and a generality can only be apprehended by a mind. Leighton of Ohio State University affirms the dualistic reply of Lotze as plausible even though he does not feel that it goes far enough. It is that the passage from one series to another is on the whole balanced and thus 84 there is no loss or gain. Ryan of the Catholic University of America asserts Lotze's statement that our belief in the soul'a unity rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, but 85 in our being able to appear to ourselves at all. The emphasis once again is on the way in which mind runs through all of the universe to justify each part as activity is shown in that part.

^{80 -} William James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 55.

^{81 -} George Conger, A Course in Philosophy, p. 141.

^{82 -} Ibid., p. 396.

^{83 -} Hocking, Types of Philosophy, p. 280.

^{84 -} Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, p. 207.

^{85 -} Ryan, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 327.

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Alexander, a Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford and Professor in the University of Manchester, calls on Lotze to show what science does as in elevating coincidences into coherences by the discovery of laws, simplifying under conceptions, unifying what is at first multiplicity. Thus philosophy and science are one in 86 spirit. Lotze's scientific mind is highly regarded and it is referred to again and again in various scholars as in Bergson. Member of the Institute and Professor at the College of France, as he says that Lotze himself suspected a fallacy in the laws of specific energy. "Himself" gives an indication of the high opinion that he had of Lotze. He also saw the conclusion from Lotze's hypothesis of local signs as being the unextended and simply qualitative character of the sensations by means of which we come to form the notion of space. This is the key to mind control.

Taylor, a Fellow of Merton College, Oxford and Professor in St. Andrews, shows the wide range of Lotze's general scientific approach. He says that a constructive system as Lotze's gives first place to a general discussion of the most universal characteristics ascribed in thought to a reality that is to be an intelligible and coherent system and not a chaos. John Locke attempts to clarify the thought of substance as applied to self and quotes Lotze on the fact of the unity of consciousness being the fact of existence as substance. Turner brings out the way that this

^{86 -} Alexander, Space Time and Deity, p. 2.

^{87 -} Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 50.

^{88 -} Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 93. 89 - Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, p. 42.

^{90 -} Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 194.

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broad approach of Lotze is able to see clearly into particular problems. He relates Locke's ideas and substance, Kant's representations and transcendental objects and Lotze's purely intelligible reals and the perceived spatial world as these show marked gl differences that make each set almost a case of opposites. Turener speaks from the University of Liverpool and tends to speak the mind of those thinkers who are trying to rationalize the new science with the old realm of ideas.

Bougle of the University of Paris is another writer who asserts that judgments of fact and of value go back to Lotze and his follower, Ritschl. He uses the position of Durkheim to point 92 this out as Durkheim is also one in the line of thought of Lotze. Bosanquet, Fellow of the British Academy, who has often been related to Lotze says that Lotze reveals his clear position by objecting to the false ideas that often arise concerning what law 93 involves. For Lotze says that it is impossible to find a point 94 at which life is not in appearance mechanically conditioned and the study of laws is tremendously important.

Gunn, Professor in the University of Melbourne and Fellow of the University of Liverpool, lifts these laws to the Infinite level in Lotze when he shows how Lotze ties up the temporal series with the Infinite by saying that it depends on the nature of things in themselves whether we shall be supplied with material

94 - Ibid., p. 149.

^{91 -} Turner, A Theory of Direct Realism, p. 61.

^{92 -} Bougle, The Evolution of Values, p. XXIX.
93 - Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 99.

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to synthesize. The important factor is that there is a directing force which could only be mind behind and through the things in themselves. Braham, a research student in Bristol and Liverpool Universities, has a chapter on Lotze's idealistic monism to show where Lotze differs with Hegel in that he holds that differentiage tions may not be essential to the unity of a personal God. This modifies the strictness of Hegel and gives the individual room in which to be himself if he cares to, but still does not take him out of the realm of effective relation with the Absolute. Thus Flewelling also brings up the fact that Lotze was the first to renounce the absolute idealism of Hegel. He shows that Lotze was trying to harmonize the differences between science and a practing idealism.

Flewelling also goes along with Lotze on the essential feature of personality. He refers to Lotze as saying that reality is that which can suffer change and yet remain the same through 98 change. This is personality as Flewelling sees it most concretely. He carries out the personalistic thought from Bowne as he teaches at the University of Southern California after studying at Boston University. In this same line again a reference may be made to Brightman. He definitely says that since Lotze illustrates both the epistemological and the moral aspects, personal stic idealism may be described as Lotzean.

^{95 -} Gunn, The Problem of Time, p. 97.

^{96 -} Braham, Personality and Immortality in Post-Kantian Thought,

^{97 -} Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 98.

^{98 -} Flewelling, Creative Personality, p. 71.

^{99 -} Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals, p. 171.

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Lotze's range of ideas is very broad and its influence is just as broad it not more so. Lange of the Universities of Zurich and Marburg under scientific psychology gives Lotze great credit for his work on medicinal psychology. In another realm, that of infinity, Vaihinger of Halle says that his new view was foreshadowed both by Hegel and Lotze. Thus in rapid fashion Lotze is able to move in influence to the mind of one who is thinking on purely natural scientific grounds and then to the mind of another who is relating his thought to the infinite. Then James appears again in relation to psychology to say that Lotze has made a deep suggestion in that previous reality is possible to all of our existence to stimulate our minds to additions to the universe's total value rather than merely being a passive factor.

Even those who do not agree with him, as many of the men referred to do not in much of their thought, are high in their praise of his development of the position which he holds. Schiller picks out Kant and Lotze to be studied in regard to the ethical basis of metaphysics though he holds to a different position 103 himself. Schiller, & Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford was close to the period of Lotze's teaching and thus was recognizing one of his own contemporaries. Lotze is credited with a new insight by Alexander as he stated that action at contact is perhaps less conceivable than at a distance because of force and **主定党党党党党委和党党党党**

^{100 -} Lange, <u>History of Materialism</u>, Vol. III, p. 175. 101 - Vaihinger, <u>The Philosophy of 'As If'</u>, p. 61.

^{102 -} James, Pragmatism, p. 256.

^{103 -} Schiller, Humanism, p. 7.

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gravitation which is exercised through the whole.

Miss Calkins of Wellesley College credits Lotze with the origin of the kinaesthetic theory for pressure or visual sensation
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in psychology and Judd of the University of Chicage supports her
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in this assertion. Also in regard to psychology Klemm of the University of Leipzig cites the mature form of spiritualism that is
a background of the most important psychologist of the nineteenth
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century. This is based on natural science as psychology and yet
the ultimate ground of reality is still spiritual.

There are yet many other idealists in our day who have been influenced greatly by Lotze's own writings or thoughts of his that have been transmitted through others. The mention of a few in addition to those that have already been named may serve to accentuate the realization that Lotze is a man who has been strong, clear and persuasive in presenting these ideas that lead to idealism. Barrett of Princeton, Bakewell of Yale, Cunningham of Cornell, Tsanoff of Rice Institute, Hendel of McGill and Hoernle of the University of Witwatersrand are all exponents of idealism and often stand close to Lotze. A man's theory must be extremely clear and strong if it is to be applied to so many fields and different modes of thought.

It does not hold that there is always agreement. That is not the important thing. The significance of Lotze's theory lies

^{104 -} Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, p. 94.

^{105 -} Calkins, A First Book in Psychology, p. 338.

^{106 -} Judd, Psychology, p. 168.

^{107 4} Klemm, A History of Psychology, p. 30.

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in the fact that it is usable in the progress of thought. He was not limited too greatly by his time. He wrote against much general criticism of idealism in the Germany of his day and if he had been a weak thinker he would have quickly succumbed to the tide of opposing thought that was ruching in all around him. The fact is that he laid down his ideas for the whole scope of thought. He accounted for the practical experience of physical nature and at the same time justified it in the light of the Infinite. He was willing to be tied down by particulars until they revealed the color of light that they were to throw upon the situation. Then he would be off on great general outlooks at the universal environment in which he found himself. There was no holding him. Lotze believed and when a particular fact was stubborn he kept at it until it opened and revealed its inner nature for in all things was truth and if it could not be dug out immediately at least the conditions for its appearance in the future could be reasonably set up and this he proceeded to do. The ideas which he had gathered up from the past were organized, new ones were added. interpretations were made and the whole was flung out to the advancing tide of thinkers to be gathered up by them and carried on into new systems of the old eternal principles.

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CHAPTER X

EXPERIENCE

"Life is more than logic." While the previous chapter dealt with ideas this chapter is to deal with feelings. Thus at the beginning appears a quotation that was common to both Lotze and James and then Bowne as he carried out an attitude that was in agreement with theirs. James even wrote Bowne to the effect that his book had stirred a responsive chord regarding this matter in the mind of James. Lotze was definitely a leader in this way of looking at things. He wanted to adhere to all the factual circumstances of natural science and the mathematical development that was based upon it, but above all he was a seeking individual trying to find his God and although he wanted to use the stepping stones of logic he didn't want to feel that it would restrict him. Brightman objects strenuously to this attitude. In his mind it implies that there is something about actual experience which ought to lead us to accept beliefs that are logically inconsistent or unsupported. He says that the cause of religion stands or falls with the cause of reason. The difference is essentially in attitude for in the final discussion neither Lotze nor Brightman would let go the factor that they do not emphacize. Lotze would always insist on the need of logic and Brightman would never deny the right of the personality to full expression in all

108 - Ferm, Contemporary American Theology, p. 59.

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forms of thought. The point to be made is that these are two individual thinkers and they are influenced by their own approach to life.

Thus the attempt will be made to see individuals and observe to a greater or lesser degree the influence of Lotze upon them. Macintosh, Professor at the Divinity School of Yale University, states that in his student days he read Metaphysic by Lotze and was profoundly impressed. His philosophy teacher who had taken his Doctor's degree at Yale under Professor Ladd was partial to Lotze and this led him to theistic personal idealism, but he also went further on that basis to speculative idealism or neo-Hegel-109 ianism. As already stated Bowne affirms his dependence on Lotze 110 and Lotze seems to have been an admirer of Bowne as a student. But Lotze held to the larger system while Bowne moved particularly within the whole toward the centrality of the self. shows an admiration for Lotze's scheme though he felt that several things were lacking. He agreed with Lotze's criticism of the absolute of Leibnitz and felt the need of translation into reality as Lotze attempted it. Smyth, a prominent clergyman, as many others like himself finds Lotze's idea of worth to be like his own and thus shows the wide influence that Lotze had in the ec-113 clesiastical field. Lotze's high philosophical system was so adapted that it could reach down into the practical and find liv-

^{109 -} Ferm, Contemporary American Theology, p. 294.

^{110 -} McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 37.

^{111 -} Ibid., p. 115. 112 - James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 120.

^{113 -} Smyth, Christian Ethics, p. 41.

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ing expression.

Webb, a Fellow of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford, emphacizes the expression of Lotze in regard to the external social relationships of God as a living love that wills the blessedness 114 of others. Thomson of Baker University refers to Lotze on the question of self and draws out his illustration on the trodden worm contrasting its suffering self with the whole remaining universe though he has no clear conception of what his self and 115 universe may be.

Montague, a Professor at Barnard College, Columbia University, says that Lotze's comment on Herbart's doctrine of degrees of intensity in mental states led him on to a new experience in animistic materialism that resulted in the spiritualistic cosmos 116 which in a sense can be expressed in physical categories. Here is an example of a fine thinker in the present day finding a direct expression of Lotze's personality through his writings.

Paulsen of the University of Berlin points out that in Germany a great period of neglect followed the reign of speculative philecosophy and after Hegel and Kant men like Fechner and Lotze became the victims of an indifference which they had neither caused 117 nor deserved. But this opposition as with the Apologists of early Christianity merely served to intensify the efforts of Lotze to prove his point on a practical basis.

^{114 -} Webb, Divine Personality and Human Life, p. 146.

^{115 -} Thomson, The Springs of Human Action, p. 191.

^{116 -} Montague, The Ways of Things, p. 666.
117 - Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 2.

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James Ward quotes Lotze on the beginning of metaphysics lying in ethics and then quotes his own way of stating the same position from the psychological standpoint. Ward, a Professor at Cambridge. Fellow of the British Academy and Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, refers to Lotze in several other places and leans heavily on Lotze's clear insight into many psychological situations. Viscount Haldane, a student of Lotze, brings out the characteristics of his physical presence. He speaks not only of Lotze's great intellectual stature but also of his high moral worth. Lotze dominated listeners with the sense of his personality and with his emphasis on personal morality was very like Kant in nature. Haldane feels that Lotze's personality was even greater than his work and perhaps this is true. A man's work stands alone in its own right, but at the same time it is a reflection of his personality and the degree to which he was willing to seek the truth. Then again it is the idea from the mind that has its effect on other minds and the personality through the work that influences other personalities. Even in Lotze's own work it is not the existent that really matters, but rather the interpretation of that existent and the ability to discover how that existent leads us to the ultimate Value in God. also brings out the fact that along with Herbart, Lotze has influenced the revision of the sciences of psychology and logic. The pathway that one man has trod leads to others that yet go on from this point and in the same general direction.

^{118 -} Ward, Essays in Philosophy, p. 168.

^{119 -} Haldane, The Pathway to Reality, p. 142.

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Urban of Dartmouth College says that the contrast of the judgments of value and the judgments of fact found first philosophical expression in Lotze and Ritschl. This was an axiological standpoint to assert the autonomy of values. The epistemo120 logical and psychological problems were brought close together.

Boodin refers to Lotze's polyphonic unity of the universe as an 121 aesthetic unity of purpose in the world. He also makes reference 122 to Lotze's idea of the kinship of truth and beauty and the poetry that was early in Lotze's mind and resulted in a volume of poems had its philosophical expression to influence a man in the University of California at Los Angeles. Keats' exaggeration of the identity of truth and beauty is considered on a logical level and justified to a certain extent in the thought of Lotze.

Lotze is cited by Piper and Ward in their course book for Syracuse University as showing a justification of creeds which give firmness, stability and definiteness of outline to religious 123 belief. They recognize his value for the religious life and even the life of the church as he sets up many high standards concerning ways of knowing God. Wilbur Urban, a Professor in Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut and former Fellow at Princeton University, pays tribute to Lotze's attempt to apprehend ultimate value through the consciousness of harmony which releases the 124 highest inspirations of reason. This statement has effect upon

^{120 -} Urban, The Intelligible World, p. 141.

^{121 -} Boodin, A Realistic Universe, p,.63.

^{122 -} Ibid., p. 308.

^{123 -} Piper and Ward, The Fields and Methods of Knowledge, p. 338.

^{124 -} Urban, Valuation Its Nature and Laws, p. 426.

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the realm that this chapter is interested in. It is the idea that reason can only develop when the mind is persuaded to an objective and will work for it no matter how great the physical difficulties may be. In the case of any great thinker such as Lotze it is the pursuit of truth and to that end he recognizes the importance of the drive of emotion.

Moore of Western Reserve University observes that Lotze follows Kant in adding feeling to intellect and will as part of the 125 whole method which is characterized by the unity of the three. Here is the method of man's searching for the truth and it delves into every realm. The soul is a dominant note here and John Laird of Queen's University of Belfast draws heavily on Lotze in his expression of The Idea of the Soul. Consciousness is lifted out of space in its essential nature as an expression of the soul and Laird refers to Lotze in that, to be in a place means simply and solely to exert action from that place and to experience the 126 actions or effects that reach that place. Consciousness occupies position merely to further the relationship of the mental and physical. Inge, a Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford, shows by quote that Lotze is really in sympathy with mysticism though Inge 127 thinks he misses the mark in many aspects of his argument.

Merrington, a Lecturer at the University of Sydney and a

Research Student at Edinburgh, shows a strong influence from Lot
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
ze though the two differ on their opinion of the Absolute. He

^{125 -} Moore, Rifts in the Universe, p. 74.

^{126 -} Laird, Problems of the Self, p. 75.

^{127 -} Inge, Christian Mysticism, p. 31.

^{128 -} Marrington, The Problem of Personality, p. 110.



also brings out the way that Rashdall follows Lotze in regarding 129
personality as an ideal directly pertaining to God. McDougall of
Harvard calls Lotze the most brilliant and thoroughgoing modern 130
defender of animism. There is a suggestion in this word of uncontrolled spiritualism, but that is the furthest thing from Lotze's thought. Broad, a Fellow in Trinity College, Cambridge,
gives Lotze as an arguer of mentalism which is favorable to human 131
survival, the point that Broad is trying to develop. But he
points out also that Lotze felt that his system did not necessicate human survival and left it as an open question.


ment concerning the interaction between the physical and the mental realms. Lotze attempted to work out a general scheme in 132 which the temperaments and ages in a human life tended to conform. At a certain age one type of temperament might be reasonably expected. There was no attempt to make this a demanding assertion, but rather a matter of persuasive influence. Lotze was very conscious of the emotions and recognized at the same time that they were often due to quite natural physical causes. Again the field of psychology appears strongly in his thinking and we realize that to his mind the fluctuating personality was a very real thing though his principle aim was to drive through all of these factors to the one fundamental purpose of personality. Just be-

^{129 -} Merrington, The Problem of Personality, p. 124.

^{130 -} McDougall, Body and Mind, p. 82.

^{131 -} Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, p. 519.

^{132 -} Coe, The Spiritual Life, p. 231.



cause a man is set on one great goal it does not mean that he cannot interpret and invsetigate the many minor factors that are essential to life. In fact his greatness depends on the extent to which he does investigate and take account of all factors to apply them to the one great whole that he seeks.

Through all of these minor things is threaded the great stream of expression that leads to the sea of knowledge. expression is governed by law so that unity is possible. Brightman says that Lotze along with Kant. Heraclitus and Darwin taught that in all change there is a law which is the basis of real Thus the one completeness has its complexity and it knowledge. is for each individual to work his way through these phases of perplexity. The individual learns by experiencing and there are some truths that he will never know unless he takes full advantage of the feeling side of his method. Lotze seems to be an example in his own life of just this sort of thing. In his student days and at a relatively early age he is fired by the desire to know that which is not fully explained by his teachers. this that starts him off on his long search and results in his deeply penetrating system of thought.

Burnham of Clark University relates this fact to his studies in psychology. He says that Lotze is an example of one who is interested in philosophic studies as the result of the doubting mind of the adolescent. He sites the fact that Lotze wrote his 134

Metaphysic at twenty-four years of age as a result of this long-

^{133 -} Ferm, Contemporary American Theology, p. 66.

^{134 -} Burnham, The Wholesome Personality, p. 571.

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ing for something definite behind all the unsupported theories that he was listening to on every hand. Thus Lotze was true to himself and his own personality in developing his general theory on personality. Perhaps it is this fact that makes it possible for Burnham also to write that personality is the great gift and the philosophical conception of the ideal of personality culminated in Lotze. He calls to mind the fact that Lotze applied this belief and theory to the political situation of Germany when he spoke to a nation that had been humiliated by Napoleon to say that they should dwell on progress in literature and science for "The German citizen is everything, Germany is nothing".

This opens up the tremendously involved social issue that follows from Lotze's theory. It cannot be said that he was limited to the hermitage of thought. His views were of tremendous consequence to his own day and to all ages of human society. He often referred to the fact that he was following Christian philosophy as it had been expressed in Jesus and later through the members of the Christian church. His ideas were so far-reaching and inclusive of all stages of life that every individual personality would be effected. There is no way out of his position execpt that of facing one's self and then being driven by such observation to the consideration of others as like natures. The one supreme Being stands behind all life and every individual is related to God.

dy of the function of organic life with the quotation, "one far
135 - Burnham, The Wholesome Personality, p. 598.

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would have ascribed to this. He knew the physical world to such an extent that he realized it could not stand alone apart from mind and the mind of God must be the focal point of all of its activity. Wilson of Syracuse University in dealing with the self and its world devotes a long section to the world as value and thus puts himself in debt also to Lotze. The relationship that Lotze established between mind and body is one that cannot be put aside. It often went far beyond efforts of the past and found a position that allowed individuality and yet preserved the unity of the whole not merely as a justification for belief, but a necessity for that which exists.

The process of naming others such as Armstrong of Wesleyan who testified that his view of realism had been reached largely 138 through the influence of Lotze might go on and on. The lists of those who have felt the sway of his, power of thought could be made longer and longer. Yet these statements are significant in lieu of a larger discussion on this topic. They show a tendency and that is their major purpose. The culmination of Booth's observations on Martin Luther may also be applied to Lotze for these words are valid for all life. "Is it not enough to see him grow in normal strength ----? Eternal validity is not given to men. Yet in a world of swiftly moving change, he sought and held steadfast the ancient truth. ---is this not enough for our hu-

^{136 -} Conklin, The Direction of Human Evolution, p. 247.


^{137 -} Wilson, The Self and Its World.

^{138 -} Adams and Montague, Contemporary American Philosophy, p. 119.

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manity?" The ancient truth that had come down through an interaction between Plato and Aristotle to find its living reality in Jesus and be carried on by subsequent thinkers was given to Lotze. He handled it tenderly though he was never afraid to question its most central assertions and from it he developed new ideas that were not only to meet the problems of his day and to a large extent those of the future but also ideas that intensified the original truth. Men seek God and life is more than logic, but logic is the method that Lotze continued to use in the face of much opposition when all else failed him.

139 - Booth, Martin Luther, p. 261.



CHAPTER XI

INTERPRETATION

As the conclusion of this short work is approached there must be general findings that rise out of the main body of its considerations. In the first place Lotze was seeking a goal for life that would also be the justification of all existence. looked for a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God." The doubting period of his early years had culminated in a great desire to find something positive in which he could believe because it was logical and reasonable and because it tended to satisfy the longing that was in his soul. Every leader in thought and action, in fact every individual who accomplishes something creative is driven by an inner urge that will not rest until that thing is accomplished. Lotze's drive carried him through the world and self, but it never let up or was deterred from its course until the climax had been reached. His was the work of an observer of the universal scene of life, but it was also the work of one who participated in all the struggles of life and felt its sorrows and joys. He strove toward a goal that was real and vital to his own consciousness.

In the second place Lotze was a critic. He could not tolerate for himself the extreme idealism of Hegel which drove the world of science into the realm of the abstract. In like manner

140 - Hebrews 11:10.

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he rebelled against the materialists who would not admit that anything was real except matter. He could not see either of these two extremes that excluded each other from their consideration of reality. He had been bred in the traditions of the Hegelian school and he hungered for facts. Particulars were of the greatest importance in his mind for he knew that the whole could not be known until its specific parts had been investigated. But at the same time Lotze was not to be limited to these particulars. He would use them as far as they would go, but he would go further. He showed that their categories as based on natural science were not enough to cover the whole realm of intelligible existence and philosophy was needed to work side by side with science. Jones of the University of Glasgow who wrote a main work on Lotze thinks that Lotze's principle service is that he co-ordinated the truths of these two opposing systems, but he does not give Lotze credit for going on to the combination of 141 them. His work was on the doctrine of thought as Lotze approached it and this does not seem to give him as clear a perspective of Lotze's whole position as he might have. But he did realize that Lotze was especially able in his criticism of the two systems that were then as now in conflict.

Thirdly Lotze is dependent on the history of thought up until his time. This is true of every thinker and interpreter of life, but Lotze seems to have carried this out to a more advanced degree than most. He immersed himself in the history of man's

^{141 -} Jones, A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze, p. 2.

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culture and looked for insights into all fields as well as making his own investigations into the field of knowledge. Lotze was anxious to study man as a psychological expression as well as one who merely held to abstract theories. Although the study of that which we know as modern psychology had not been considered very intellectually respectable Lotze realized that it was a way out of the dilemma that presented itself. Thus he found many points of agreement with the Greeks at the same time that he was criticizing their theories of life. He caught the significance of the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to life and made each a part of his own. He examined the fields of art and literature and especially their effect upon the thought of man. The years of the past gave him a broad approach and once he had seen the full sweep of history he was never to be held down by narrow partial truths. He wanted truth that would be universal in its scope and true for all situations no matter how minute.


Thus in spite of his dependence on the past Lotze was in the fourth place an innovator in thought. He did not create much that was new in the way of system, but there were too many of those existing already. He brought out the individual personality as it had never been considered before and he related it to all of this scope of knowledge which had been considered. His study was of culture because culture was the expression of man's nature. Systems were not the most important thing. They were merely subsidiary aids to the realization of the great worth of man's nature as a person. But the study of man himself would lead to a system that was all inclusive, not merely a system but

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an expression of that which is and a reason for its being. A system that was so real it could only be applied to a mind that knew all of reality and the mind that could fulfill this function was the mind of God. There was no other way. Men must recognize that the same thing that had been leading their aesthetic thought through the ages was the realization of their practical function. Nature was the way to God as well as the mysticism of the inner spirit. God was the only character that could meet both factors and not be found wanting in either. The way to God was through personality expressed in the world of physical objects and here Lotze spanned the gap between mind and body and so intensified his theory to the living reality that the gap disappeared into nothingness. Others sought the way out through system and the-ory. Lotze found it in life.

In the fifth place Lotze expressed his theory in his own life. As a personality he stressed the good nature that was essential to his metaphysics. Along with his belief that the mind was able to effect physical nature he tried to change and influence the objective realm through his work against suffering and evil. Thus Lotze carried out one of the conditions of being a real philosopher. He applied his theory to life.

Finally the question as to what form of reality should be assigned to the realm of ends must be considered. Thomas in his work on Lotze's theory of reality feels that Lotze did not answer Kant's question as to how reason can be one both in the practical and theoretical spheres. He states that Lotze in his keen



analysis widened the difference between these spheres. But this work has sought to show the fundamental unity of existence as Lotze saw it. Thus we must disagree with and at the same time affirm the conclusions that Thomas reached. Lotze did intensify the individuality of each field and in doing so made one the source of activity and the other the result. The mechanism of natural science and bodily function is the way in which the mind of God and to a lesser extent the mind of man articulate themselves. Both sides are needed, but neither is complete in itself. The gap is obliterated by the living personal spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has created. Theory shows the two spheres to be distinct but living personality draws the 143 two into unity in itself.

^{142 -} Thomas, Lotze's Theory of Reality, p. 213. 143 - Refer to p. 93 of this same work.


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
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


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
ABSTRACT

OF

THE THEISM OF HERMANN LOTZE

Hermann Lotze is found in an age of philosophy that is marked by an abundance of material and also a great deal of confusion. The field of physical science is just beginning to open up its new horizons. In this period he opposes the extreme idealism of Hegel and meets the inrushing tides of science to establish a middle ground between the two that may be known as personal idealism. Lotze is in essential agreement with the emphasis of Plato and also that of Aristotle. Their extremes are tempered by his practical mind and their fundamental arguments are reemphacized. The span from these two thinkers to the time of Lotze finds many who are carrying on the essential ideas that Lotze later incorporates into his system.

Lotze regards nature as objective and essential to any study concerning reality. He brings out its distinctness, but in doing this shows that the mechanism of nature leads to one ultimate source of all its activity in mind. In the final stage this is the mind of God. He considers life to be the means by which activity is possible. Life is the factor that makes relationship between mind and nature possible and it is the direct expression of God through all things, both subjective and objective. Lotze puts man in the highest position possible in a theistic universe.



Man is characterized by personality and personality is an attribute of God. The distinction between the two is that man is limited and God is not. Personality is the only full expression of spirit and creation is of spirits alone. Thus the world and individuals are possible because of the existence and reality of spiritual personality. Devotion is the highest calling of man's nature. He is privileged to recognize the world in which he lives and then work back through that world and himself to closer communion with God in regard to recognition. This is the ultimate of man's mental activity.

After Lotze's time it was discovered that his influence was very great. On the level of theory he was one of the leaders in the field of modern psychology. His theories of physical nature were often adhered to by those who followed him as well as his theories concerning metaphysics and the spiritual realm. More intense than that were the influences of his activities in the realm of experience. Many individuals found a personal response to him and those who were not thus privileged were often stirred by the spirit of personality in his writings. He was seeking a goal for life that would also be the justification of all existence. He was a critic of the history of thought up to his time and especially that directly preceding him. In this respect he depended greatly upon the truths that he was able to dig out of the past. He was an innovator in thought as he trod paths that had not been dealt with before in the way that he considered them. He expressed this theory in his own life and stood finally on the fact that creation is of spirits alone.

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